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Abstract

Contracts between suppliers and customers frequently contain
provisions rewarding the customer for exhibiting loyalty to the seller.
For example, suppliers may offer customers preferential pricing for
buying a specified percentage of their requirements from the supplier
or buying minimum numbers of products across multiple product
lines. Such loyalty-inducing contracts have come under attack on
antitrust grounds because of their potential to foreclose competitors
or soften competition by enabling tacit collusion among suppliers.
This article defends loyalty inducement as a commercial practice.
Although it can be anticompetitive under some circumstances,
rewarding loyal customers is usually procompetitive and pricereducing. The two most severe attacks on loyalty discounting—that
loyalty discounts are often disguised disloyalty penalties and that
loyalty clauses soften competition—are unlikely to hold as a general
matter. Nor are arguments that customers only accede to loyalty
inducements because of collective action problems generally true.
Dominant buyers who face few collective action problems frequently
use loyalty commitments to leverage their buying power and obtain
lower prices.
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Bargaining Over Loyalty

Daniel A. Crane*

“These kinds of agreements allow firms to reward their most loyal
customers. Rewarding customer loyalty promotes competition on the
merits.”
Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256,
265 (2d Cir. 2001)
Loyalty has an unambiguously positive connotation in ordinary
discourse and in most legal fields.1 For example, ethical canons
require attorneys to remain faithful to their clients;2 trustees and
board members owe fiduciary duties to beneficiaries and
shareholders;3 spouses enjoy testimonial privileges based on social
conventions respecting marital loyalty;4 adultery remains
criminalized in most states and a felony in some;5 democratic theory
requires judges to remain faithful to the will of the people expressed

* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Caroline Flynn provided excellent
research assistance.
1
See generally ERIC FELTEN, LOYALTY: THE VEXING VIRTUE (2011) (examining
the virtue of loyalty in historical and contextual perspective).
2
Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 5 (specifying requirements of lawyer
loyalty to client).
3
See, e.g., Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus
on Loyalty, 11 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 675 (2009).
4
See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2333 (McNaughten rev. 1961).
5
See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 14, ch. 274, § 1; Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§750.30.
2
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in constitutions or statutes;6 and the law metes out far greater harsher
punishment on the traitor than the common enemy.7 George Fletcher
has observed that “[s]ome of the strongest moral epithets in the
English language are reserved for the weak who cannot meet the
threshold of loyalty: They commit adultery, betrayal, treason.”8
Reflecting venomous disapprobation of treachery, Dante placed the
traitors Brutus, Cassius, and Judas Iscariot in Lucifer’s jaws in Hell’s
ninth circle.9 In most contexts, loyalty only becomes difficult
ethically and morally when loyalty obligations collide—when loyalty
to one person means disloyalty to another.10
Antitrust law is exceptional—loyalty receives a far less congenial
welcome. Antitrust values rivalry between competing sellers, which
implies an opportunity to steal business from the rival. Customer
loyalty obstructs this hydraulic action. Particularly troubling are
inducements to loyalty offered by firms with market power. When
dominant sellers offer customers incentives to remain loyal to the
seller, these loyalty incentives may stifle competition and harm the
very customers offered the ostensibly favorable terms. Even if the
customer understands the loyalty incentive’s exclusionary or
collusive potential, she may find it to be in her economic interest to
accept the incentive since other customers will be accepting it
regardless of her decision. Dominant firms may require their
customers to remain loyal for the purpose of starving rivals of sales
opportunities, thus ensuring that in the long run there are no other
sellers to tempt customers into disloyalty. Or, they may use loyalty
incentives to facilitate supracompetitive oligopolistic pricing.
Loyalty or fidelity incentives have recently been challenged
under the antitrust laws in the United States and the European Union.
For example, parallel cases in the U.S. and EU against British
Airways and Intel challenged those dominant firms’ practices of
incentivizing customers—travel agents or computer manufacturers—
to remain loyal to British Airways or Intel at the expense of smaller
6

See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and
Theory, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 395 (1995).
7
See George P. Fletcher, The Case for Treason, 41 Md. L. Rev. 193 (1982)
(PAREN).
8
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF
RELATIONSHIPS 8 (1993).
9
DANTE ALIGHIERI, INFERNO, Canto 34, ll. 64-68, at 537 (Robert M. Durling ed.
& trans., 1996).
10
See Felten, supra n. xxx (examining moral dilemmas raised by conflicts of
loyalty).
3
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rivals, Virgin Atlantic and AMD.11 Scores of other cases challenging
loyalty discounts, rebates, or other incentives have been filed on both
sides of the Atlantic, particularly in private lawsuits in the U.S.12 An
extensive academic literature assesses the ways in which loyalty
incentives can exclude competitors or soften competition.13
11

Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256 (2d. Cir.
2001) (rejecting Virgin Atlantic’s challenge to British Airways’ loyalty incentives
to travel agents); In re Intel Corp., Administrative Complaint, FTC Docket # 934
(Dec. 16, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf
(challenging Intel’s market share rebates to original equipment manufacturers);
Summary of Commission Decision of 13 May 2009 Relating to a Proceeding
Under Article 82 of the EC Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement
(COMP/C-3/37.990—Intel), 2009 O.J. (C 227) (finding Intel’s market share
rebates to original equipment manufacturers incompatible with Articles 101 and
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euopean Union and fining Intel €1.06
billion); Case C-95/04 P, British Airways Plc v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331
(finding British Airways . . . ).
12
See infra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx.
13
The literature on the potential anticompetitive effects of loyalty discounts
includes Einer Elhauge & Abraham L. Wickelgren, Anti-competitive Exclusion and
Market Division Through Loyalty Discounts,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1937658; Einer Elhauge &
Abraham L. Wickelgren, Robust Exclusion Through Loyalty Discounts, John M.
Olin Center for Law, Economics & Business Discussion Paper No. 662 (Jan.
2010); Leslie M. Marx & Greg Shaffer, Rent Shifting, Exclusion, and Market-Share
Discounts, http://www.simon.rochester.edu/fac/shaffer/Published/rentshift.pdf;
Jonathan M. Jacobson, A Note on Loyalty Discounts, 9-JUN Antitrust Source 1
(2010); Einer Elhauge, How Loyalty Discounts Can Perversely Discourage
Discounting, 5 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 189 (2009); David E. Mills, Inducing
Downstream Selling Effort with Market Share Discounts,
http://www.virginia.edu/economics/Workshops/papers/mills/Market%20Share%20
Discounts.pdf; Richard A. Duncan & Brian S. McCormac, Loyalty & Fidelity
Discounts and Rebates in the U.S. & E.U.: Will Divergence Occur Over CostBased Standards of Liability, 9 Sedona Conf. J. 133 (2008); Gianluca Faella, The
Antitrust Assessment of Loyalty Discounts and Rebates, 4 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 375
(2008); Benjamin Klein & Andres V. Lerner, The Expanded Economics of FreeRiding: How Exclusive Dealing Prevents Free-Riding and Creates Undivided
Loyalty, 74 Antitrust L. J. 473 (2007); Janusz Ordover & Greg Shaffer,
Exclusionary Discounts, (CCP Working Paper No. 07-13, 2007); Louis Kaplow &
Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 Handbook of Law & Economics 1073 (2007); David
Spector, Loyalty Rebates: An Assessment of Competition Concerns and a
Proposed Structured Rule of Reason, 1 Comp. Pol’y Int’l 89 (2005); Joseph
Farrell, Deconstructing Chicago on Exclusive Dealing, 50 Antitrust Bulletin 465
(2005); Bruce Kobayashi, The Economics of Loyalty Discounts and Antitrust Law
in the United States, 1 Comp. Policy Int. 115 (2005); Patrick Greenlee & David
Reitman, Competing with Loyalty Discounts, (EAG Discussion Paper 04-2, 2004);
4
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Although loyalty incentives can harm competition, they also can
enhance consumer welfare by driving down prices and facilitating
more efficient exchange between buyers and sellers. One strand
missing in the current literature—which largely focuses on the
deployment of loyalty incentives by dominant sellers—is the extent
to which customers play a strong role in proposing and propagating
the use of loyalty incentives. Customers willingly exchange loyalty
commitments for lower prices. This phenomenon cannot simply be
dismissed as the product of customer collective action problems.
Monopsony or oligopsony buyers who face few collective action
problems frequently use loyalty discounts to drive prices down. The
federal government, perhaps the world’s most powerful buyer,
frequently uses loyalty incentives to drive down its acquisition costs.
Collective purchasing societies such as hospital Group Purchasing
Organizations, Pharmacy Benefit Managers, and buyer cooperatives,
which are formed in large part to solve collective action problems,
often push for loyalty discounts or rebates as part of their strategy to
lower their member prices.14 Academic marketing literature describes
loyalty as a bargaining chip that can be beneficially exploited by both
strong and weak buyers.15
This Article contributes to the ongoing legal and economic
discussion over loyalty discounts in three ways. First, in Part I, it
situates the conversation over loyalty discounts within the broader
conversation over exclusionary practices and law’s response. In
particular, Part I distinguishes loyalty discounts from volume
discounts, introduces current legal treatment of loyalty discounts in
the United States and European Union, and discusses the way that
U.S. antitrust law on loyalty discounts is likely to evolve in light of
recent precedent—not primarily by the development of new legal
rules but by the expression of judicial maxims such as the quotation
from the Virgin Atlantic decision at the beginning of this Article.
This Article’s second major contribution is to answer two
developing criticisms of loyalty discounts that have the potential to
turn into anti-loyalty judicial maxims. The first of these is that
Willard K. Tom, David A. Balto & Neil W. Averitt, Anticompetitive Aspects of
Market-Share Discounts and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing, 67 Antitrust L.
J. 615 (2000); Ilya R. Segal & Michael Whinston, Naked Exclusion: Comment, 90
Am. Econ. Rev. 296 (2000); Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer & John S.
Wiley, Naked Exclusion, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 296 (1991).
14
See infra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx.
15
See infra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx.
5
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loyalty discounts need not be—and often are not—true discounts, but
rather disloyalty penalties. This claim is economically implausible,
since it would have the seller giving the buyer a choice of accepting
either a price above the profit-maximizing monopoly level or else an
onerous contractual term above the profit-maximizing monopoly
level. Either scenario would effectively cause the monopolist to
exceed the profit-maximizing monopoly price and hence be
unprofitable. The second criticism of loyalty discounts is that they
soften competition between sellers—essentially that they facilitate
supracompetitive seller pricing even without excluding any seller
from the market. Part II shows that the assumptions underlying this
claim are restrictive and not generalizable and that counterevidence
suggests that if loyalty discounts are anticompetitive, it is only
because they are sometimes exclusionary.
This Article’s final major contribution, made in Part III, is to
reorient the conversation away from an assumption that loyalty
incentives are seller-initiated strategies. Rather, the available
evidence suggests that loyalty incentives are often bargaining chips
in negotiations between sellers and buyers—invoked by customers as
often as suppliers in return for other concessions. Thinking about
loyalty incentives as bargaining chips does not dispel the possibility
that such provisions can have exclusionary effects, but it does
suggest that courts should be cautious about discouraging the use of
loyalty incentives, which may take away a chip that buyers could
otherwise invoke to improve their position.
I. FOUNDATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Loyalty and Volume
Loyalty provisions come in a variety of forms. The strongest
form is a pure exclusive dealing agreement in which the buyer
promises to buy all of its requirements from the supplier and not to
purchase from any other supplier.16 Short of this, contracts
sometimes contain partial exclusive dealing clauses that commit the
buyer to make a specified level or percentage of its purchases from

16

See generally 11 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶ 1821 (3d ed. 2011).
6
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the seller.17 Often sellers seek to induce loyalty rather than to require
it. Loyalty inducement provisions also take a good many forms, but
their common denominator is an option on the buyer’s part to secure
a better price by demonstrating greater loyalty. Two common forms
are market share discounts and bundled discounts.
Bundled discounts offer a buyer a better price for purchasing
minimum amounts of the seller’s product across two more separate
product lines.18 For example, in one of the leading recent bundled
discount cases, the conglomerate manufacturer 3M offered retailers
rebates that were conditioned the retailer making minimum purchases
on six of 3M’s product lines including Health Care Products, Home
Care Products, Home Improvement Products, Stationery Products,
Retail Auto Products, and Leisure Time.19 Unlike a single-product
volume discount, the customer can only achieve bundled discounts or
rebates by demonstrating loyalty in a number of separate buckets of
purchases.
Although bundled discounts partake of many of the attributes of
single-product loyalty discounts, they add significant complexities.
Bundled discounts create different kinds of exclusionary effects—
particularly the potential to exclude rivals that do not sell the
dominant firm’s full product line.20 They also may exhibit different
sorts of efficiencies or procompetitive justifications—such as the
potential to eliminate double marginalization—21 that would not
generally be true of single-product loyalty discounts.22 Further,

17

Tom, et al, supra n. xxx at 622-627 (discussing anticompetitive effects arising
from partial exclusive dealing);
18
Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55
Emory L. J. 423 (2006) (analyzing economics of bundled discounting); Elhauge,
Tying, Bundled Discounts, supra n. xxx (discussing exclusionary potential of
bundled discounts); Thomas A. Lambert, Appropriate Liability Rules for Tying and
Bundled Discounting, 72 Ohio State L. J. 909 (2011); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Complex Bundled Discounts and Antitrust Policy, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 1227 (2009).
19
LePage’s, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
20
See Crane, Mixed Bundling, supra n. xxx at 443-47 (exploring exclusionary
potential of bundled discounts).
21
Id. at 434-36; Erik Hovenkamp & Herbert Hovenkamp, Tying Arrangements and
Antitrust Harm, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 925 (2010).
22
But see Sreya Kolay, Greg Shaffer & Janusz Ordover, “All-Units Discounts in
Retail Contracts,” 13 Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 429 (2004)
7
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bundled discounts raise unique theoretical questions about the
plausibility of a dominant firm’s exclusionary strategy—such as
whether it would be rational for a firm to use a bundled discount to
leverage market power in one market to obtain a monopoly in a
second market in light of the fact that raising the price in the second
market might reduce sales in the first market if the two goods are
complements.23 Because of these significant distinctions, bundled
discounts merit separate consideration from single-product market
share or other loyalty discounts and are beyond the scope of this
Article.
Market share discounts are the paradigmatic single-product
loyalty incentive. They operate by granting the buyer a better price if
it purchases specified percentages of its requirements from the
seller.24 Market share discounts are sometime graduated—for
(discussing potential of even single-product market share discounts to eliminate
double marginalization).
23
See Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, supra n. xxx at 403-19. The Chicago
School of economic analysis argued that it would be irrational for a firm with a
monopoly in market A to attempt to leverage its power into a complementary
market B, since increasing the price of one product leads to a diminution in the
demand for its complements. Hence, by leveraging monopoly power and
attempting to extract a second monopoly profit, the dominant firm would simply be
cannibalizing its own profits in the leveraging market. See ROBERT A. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX 372-75, 380-81 (1978); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW 197-99 (2d ed. 2001); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the
Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L.J. 19, 20-23 (1957); Aaron Director & Edward H.
Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L. Rev. 281, 290-92
(1956). Elhauge argues that the one monopoly profit theory overlooked a number
of ways in which leverage could be profitable.
24
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Obama Administration and Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 1611, 1649-50 (2010) (explaining distinctions between
quantity and market share discounts). A variation on a market share requirement is
a retail shelf placement requirement. In Church & Dwight Co. v. Mayer Labs.,
Inc., ___ F. Supp. 2d ___ (N.D Cal. 2012), for example, a condom manufacturer
granted retailers different levels of rebates for maintaining its products in various
percentages of the retailer’s shelf-space dedicated to condoms, for example a 55%
tier (awarding a 4.0% rebate for 55% or more of a retail chain's display space), a
65% tier (awarding a 7% rebate for 65% or more of the display space), and a 70%
tier (awarding a 7.5% rebate for 70% or more of the display space.
8
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example, a buyer receives a 5% discount for purchasing 60% or more
of its requirements from the seller, a 7% discount for purchasing 75%
or more, and a 9% discount for purchasing 90% or more. Also,
market share discounts may apply only to incremental dollars (i.e., to
all purchases above 60%) or retroactively to the first dollar.25 A
loyalty discount can be given instantaneously at the point of sale or
rebated at some later time, such as at year’s end.
How loyalty discounts are structured is often significant in
determining whether they can have exclusionary effects. For
example, first-dollar rebates are usually considered more problematic
than incremental dollar discounts, since smaller rivals of the seller
have to compete against price concessions given across a far greater
swath of sales.26 Contracts with claw-back features, where the seller
grants the buyer a favorable price on the assumption that it will meet
a loyalty threshold subject to a repayment obligation in the event the
buyer does not meet the threshold, may create particular antitrust
risks insofar as buyers may be loath to run the risk of incurring large
lump-sum penalties at year’s end and hence remain strictly loyal to
the seller.27
25

See Jonathan M. Jacobson, A Note on Loyalty Discounts, 9-JUN Antitrust Source
1, 1-2 (2010) (explaining first-dollar discounts); Duncan, supra n. xxx at 134
(explaining distinctions between first-dollar and incremental dollar discounts).
26
Jonathan M. Jacobson, Towards a Consistent Antitrust Treatment for Unilateral
Conduct, 8-FEB Antitrust Source 1, 6 (2009) (explaining that “first dollar discounts
may provide especially strong inducements--in some instances, outright coercion-because they apply not only to the contested volume but to all of the customer's
purchases, enhancing a loss if the percentage commitment is not fulfilled”); Robert
H. Lande, Should Predatory Pricing Rules Immunize Exclusionary Discounts, 2006
Utah L. Rev. 863, 864 (2006) (“Unlike ‘regular’ discounts, which are almost
always procompetitive, retroactive discounts have a strong exclusionary and
anticompetitive potential.”).
27
See Jonathan M. Jacobson, Towards a Consistent Antitrust Policy for Unilateral
Conduct, 8-FEB Antitrust Source 1, 6 (2009) (“Some such discounts, called “first
dollar” discounts, may provide especially strong inducements--in some instances,
outright coercion--because they apply not only to the contested volume but to all of
the customer's purchases, enhancing a loss if the percentage commitment is not
fulfilled.”). Allegations about claw-back provisions have been at issue in some
recent loyalty discount cases. See Southeast Missouri Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642
F.3d 608, 617 (8th Cir. 2011).
9
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One of the frequently discussed questions with respect to market
share discounts is why a seller who wants to reward high-volume
customers should not simply offer a traditional volume discount.28
Before getting to some of the answers, it is worth noting that
sometimes volume and loyalty discounting is substantively
equivalent. Volume discounts and loyalty discounts can be identical
in operation. Suppose, for example, that the buyer has a stable need
for 100 tons of salt per year. If the seller offers the buyer a 5% price
reduction for buying 80 tons of salt or 80% of its salt requirements
per year, the effect on the buyer’s incentives will be identical
assuming its buying needs stay constant.29
On the other hand, market share discounts often differ from
volume discounts in significant ways. In several circumstances,
market share discounts may be more advantageous to the buyer than
volume discounts.
First, market share discounts have the effect of shifting risks of
changing market circumstances from buyers to sellers in ways that
volume discounts do not.30 For example, Herbert Hovenkamp has
28

See, e.g., Evaluating the Competitive Effects of Exclusive Dealing Agreements,
An ABA Section of Antitrust Law and ABA Center for Continuing Legal
Education Telesminar, in Cooperation with the Antitrust Section of the Houston
Bar Association (Houston, Texas June 24, 2005), 5-NOV Antitrust Source 1, 6
(2005) ([W]hy reward your best customers with a “loyalty” discount? Why not do
it instead through a less restrictive alternative like a volume discount?”) (comments
of Joe Grinstein). On the distinction between market share and loyalty discounts,
see ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 265 n. 6 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing
Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 768, at 169 (3d ed.
2008)).
29
A case in point is then-Judge Breyer’s decision in Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT
Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227 (lst Cir. 1983), which involved the market for
snubbers, safety devices used in nuclear power plants. The defendant then offered
a major customer a large discount if it would agree to purchase large quantities of
snubbers, amounting to a large share of its expected purchases, over a two-year
period. Since the customer’s snubber needs were stable and predictable, it
probably would have made little difference if the supplier made the discount
contingent on loyalty or volume.
30
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62
Fla. L. Rev. 871, 889 (2010) (explaining that a seller like Intel uses market share
discounts rather than volume discounts in order to shift the costs of market
10
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explained Intel’s market share discounts as a means of shifting the
risk of a weakening market from original equipment manufacturers
like Dell and HP to Intel.31 If the computer market weakens more
than expected, Dell and HP might not be able to meet a contractually
specified volume threshold and hence might lose a volume-based
discount. However, if to obtain Intel’s lowest price they must just
buy a specified percentage of their central processing unit needs from
Intel—say 80%—they can continue to claim the best price even in a
weak computer market.
Second, and in a same vein, market share discounts may be used
to guarantee the supplier a minimum volume of sales when the
requirements of a group of customers are unpredictable.32 To stay
with the computer industry, suppose that Intel will be able to
optimize its planning and achieve economies of scale if it knows that
it will sell at least one million CPUs in the coming year. Although it
makes a fairly strong prediction that the total volume of CPU sales in
the market will be around two million, the OEMs are engaged in a
fierce market share battle of their own and the CPU requirements of
any individual OEM are hard to determine given the vagaries of the
market. Intel may identify a group of OEMs that are likely to
purchase around 1.25 million collectively, although the distribution
of purchases within the group is uncertain. If each of the OEMs in
this group agrees to purchase 80% of its requirements from Intel,
Intel can count on making a million CPU sales in the coming year
from this group of customers. From Intel’s perspective, it is
beneficial to offer a discount in exchange for a market share
commitment so that Intel can plan on the level of sales it will make in
the coming year and perhaps optimize its production facilities. From
the OEM’s perspective, the deal is also beneficial. The OEMs secure
downturns from its customers to itself: “A quantity discount attaches to a specified
number of chips, and if the market becomes weak and the computer maker's sales
fall below that number, the computer maker must pay the higher price. By contrast,
the market share discount attaches to, say, 90% of the buyer's sales, whatever they
happen to be. So the market share discount offers the computer maker the lower
price, even if the market becomes weak, provided that the computer maker
purchases its requisite percentage of chips from the seller.”).
31
Id.
32
C.f. Jacobson, supra n. xxx at 3 (“A supplier can offer volume discounts or other
price concessions, without loyalty commitments, to generate volume to account for
high fixed costs.”).
11
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a more favorable price and one that does not require them to commit
to a volume of purchases they may be unable to meet.33
Third, market share discounts may enable even relatively small
buyers who might not qualify for a volume discount to enhance their
bargaining position with suppliers and exact pricing concessions.
This occurs because the buyer is able to exchange its freedom to
pursue variety in its purchases for a lower price. By foregoing its
variety preferences and focusing on a single seller, the buyer
effectively elasticizes the demand facing the seller and hence can
obtain a better price.34 Developing this model, Ben Klein and Kevin
Murphy consider the example of packaged food manufacturers
competing for retail shelf space.35 Each manufacturer would like to
secure the most shelf space possible for its products. Retailers are
much less interested than the manufacturer as to which brand of
spices gets precedence on their shelves. They are competing against
other manufacturers to create the optimal basket of product selection,
price, and service.36 The retailer essentially acts as a bargaining
agent for the interests of its customers, trading off different
characteristics. When the retailer commits to partial or exclusive
shelf-space loyalty to a particular brand, it will disappoint some
customers who would prefer access to a different brand.37 But, by
foregoing customer’s variety preferences, the retailer elasticizes the
demand facing the manufacturer.38 This, in turn, allows the retailer
to obtain better wholesale prices and pass them along to customers as
better retail prices.39 Although it entails some loss of consumer
surplus—the customers who had strong variety preferences—the
aggregate consumer welfare effects due to the lower prices can be
significantly positive.40 Significantly, Klein and Murphy’s model
33

This effect could be realized even if the buyers do not commit ex ante to
purchase 80% of their requirements from the seller but the seller expects that the
offer of discount if they do will incentivize them purchase the 80% share.
Commitment is just a strong form of expectation.
34
Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Exclusive Dealing Intensifies Competition
for Distribution, 75 Antitrust L.J. 433, 437-65 (2008).
35
Id.
36
Id. at 443.
37
Id. at 451.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
12
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shows how even relatively small purchasers with little buying power
can deploy loyalty to secure better prices.41
Loyal behavior by buyers can have similar properties to the
preferred shelf space commitments discussed by Klein and Murphy.
Imagine a small, regional hospital that needs to purchase catheters.
Assume that there are four major catheter suppliers, and that
catheters are somewhat differentiated products. The nurses and other
medical professionals who administer catheters have idiosyncratic
preferences for different brands. If each hospital ward or unit makes
its own purchasing decision, the hospital will end up using all four
brands. Suppose, however, that hospital procurement administrators
decide to cut costs by centralizing the hospital’s purchasing
decisions. One effect of this is to increase the volume the hospital
can use as leverage in any purchasing negotiation. But even
consolidating all of the hospital’s buying power may not secure the
hospital much leverage. By committing to loyalty—for example
deciding to buy 85% of its catheter requirements from a single
manufacturer—the hospital elasticizes the demand facing the
manufacturers. Nurses may no longer have as easy access to their
preferred brand of catheter, but the overall effect on composite
patient pricing and quality may be positive.
An obvious objection to this and the shelf space illustrations is
that loyalty discounts secure lower prices at the expense of
individuals with idiosyncratic needs or preferences—the gourmet
cook who highly valued a particular brand of spice or the neonatal
unit nurse who believes that a particular brand of catheter is optimal
41

Id. at 459 (noting that “significantly lower wholesale prices can be achieved by
retailers with relatively small market shares as long as the retailer has the ability to
influence the share of its customers' purchases in a product category that is
obtained by a chosen manufacturer”). At least one federal court has recognized this
benefit of market share discounts, without exploring the economic rationale. See
Smith Wholesale Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 477 F.3d 854, 864-65 (6th Cir.
2007) (“Market share discounts theoretically level the playing field by allowing
competing purchasers of like commodities to participate on equal terms, regardless
of size, because such discounts depend not on volume purchases, but on the
percentage of purchases of a particular category of products.”); see also Donald
Hawthorne & Margaret Sanderson, Rigorous Analysis of Economic Evidence on
Class Certification in Antitrust Cases, 24-FALL Antitrust 55, 59 (2009) (reporting
that Tyco’s market share discounts for pulse oximeters allowed small hospitals to
achieve lower prices than they could under pure volume discounts).
13
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for her patients’ needs. Part of the answer—already told—is that
many purchasing decisions made by intermediaries or agents on
behalf of others necessarily involve trade-offs between price, variety,
quality, and convenience. The other part of the answer is that the use
of commercial loyalty devices need not result in complete
homogenization of the available product offering. As already
discussed—and discussed further below—market share discounts are
often partial, providing for the purchase by the buyer of a large
portion, but not all, of its requirements.42 One of the reasons that
many loyalty discounts are set at 80 or 85% is to allow some room
for the buyer agent or intermediary to honor the variety preferences
of the most variety-preferring principals (such as nurses or grocery
shoppers). Of course, committing a lower percentage in order to
preserve the preferences of the principals with the most inelastic
demand diminishes the elasticizing effect of committing to loyalty.
But it is these kinds of trade-off decisions that intermediaries and
agents routinely make.
B. Current Legal Treatment
Single-product loyalty inducements have been recently
challenged in both the United States and the European Union as
exclusionary or otherwise anticompetitive devices. In the United
States, they have been principally challenged as restraints of trade
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,43 monopolizing devices in
violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act,44 exclusive dealing
agreements under Section 3 of the Clayton Act,45 price discrimination
in violation of the Robinson-Patman Act,46 or violations of Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.47 In the European Union, they
have been challenged as abridgements of Article 101 on the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), which
prohibits restrictive agreements and Article 102 which prohibits
abuse of a dominant position. This Article will not discuss the
potential differences between these separate legal theories within
42

See supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx.
15 U.S.C. § 1.
44
15 U.S.C. § 2.
45
15 U.S.C. § 3.
46
15 U.S.C. § 13.
47
15 U.S.C. § 45.
14
43
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each legal regime but instead consider the overall treatment of loyalty
provisions as a class.
In recent years, loyalty provisions have received a generally
hospitable welcome in U.S. the courts, although not so much at the
Federal Trade Commission.
Private challenges—usually by
competitors—have alleged that loyalty discounts result in de facto
exclusivity or semi-exclusivity and foreclose smaller rivals’
opportunities to enter or expand in the market. Such challenges in a
variety of industries, including boat engines,48 medical devices,49
pharmaceuticals,50 automotive sandpaper,51 wholesale tobacco,52
condoms,53 and airline travel,54 have generally met with failure.
Plaintiffs have succeeded in a few cases.55 Some courts have held
that loyalty discounts are price concessions that are not illegal unless
they result in the dominant firm pricing below an appropriate

48

Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (8 th Cir. 2000).
Southeast Missouri Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608 (8 th Cir. 2011); Allied
Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Group LP, 592 F.3d 991 (2010).
50
J.B.D.L. Corp. v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, Inc., No. 1:01-CV-704, 1:03-CV781, (S.D. Ohio June 13, 2005).
51
NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442 (2007).
52
See Smith Wholesale Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 477 F.3d 854, 864-65
(6th Cir. 2007); Smith Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 219 Fed.
Appx. 298 (6th Cir. 2007).
53
Church & Dwight, supra n. xxx.
54
Virgin Atlantic, supra n. xxx.
55
See infra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx (concerning FTC action against
Intel). See also Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Group, L.P., 250 Fed. Appx.
95 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that legality of market share discounts in truck
transmission market was question for jury); Z.F. Meritor LLC v. Eaton Group, 769
F. Supp. 2d 684 (D. Del. 2011), aff’d 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012); U.S. v. Dentsply
Intern., Inc., 2006-2 Trade Cases P 75,383, 2006 WL 2612167 (D. Del. April 26,
2006) (prohibiting Dentsply from offering market share discounts to any dealer);
Natchitoches Parish Hosp. v. Tyco Intern., Ltd., No. 1:05-CV-12024-PBS., (D.
Mass. Nov. 20, 2009); The allegations in the case, U.S. v. Dentsply Intern., Inc.,
399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005), involved pure exclusive dealing and not loyalty
discounting.
15
49
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measure of cost.56 Since showing below-cost pricing is difficult to
establish given contemporary U.S. antitrust jurisprudence,57 most
such challenges have failed. The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet
heard a loyalty discount case, and U.S. antitrust jurisprudence has not
settled on a consistent, unified approach to the problem.
A brief discussion of the two cases mentioned in the
introduction—Virgin Atlantic and Intel—will illustrate these issues
and provide some contrast and comparison to the European treatment
of loyalty discounts.58
Virgin Atlantic arose from one of the many chapters in Sir.
Richard Branson’s war to break British Airway’s (“BA”) dominance
in trans-Atlantic travel. Virgin entered the trans-Atlantic market in
the mid-1980s and soon grew to be a serious competitor to other
major U.S.-London carriers, particularly American Airlines and
British Airways.59
In the mid-1990s, partly in response to
competition from Virgin, British Airways introduced a series of
“Incentive Plans” targeted at travel agents and corporate buyers.60
Although some of the incentives were based on volume (how much
revenue a travel agent pushed in BA’s direction), others were based
on market share—BA’s percentage share of the U.S.-U.K. flights
booked by the agent.61 The discounts were typically “first dollar,”
meaning that when a customer reached the target threshold, it
received a discounted price on earlier purchases.62 Virgin brought
suit, alleging that the incentive agreements, along with BA’s ability
to prevent Virgin from obtaining necessary slots at London’s
56

See, e.g., Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1062 (rejecting district court’s holding that
plaintiff would not have to show pricing below an appropriate measure of cost in
order to establish illegality of market share agreements).
57
Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 7
(2005).
58

A brief discussion of the treatment of loyalty discounts or rebates outside the
United States and European Union can be found in EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN
GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 693-94 (2d ed. 2011).
59
257 F.3d at 259-60.
60
257 F.3d at 261.
61
69 F. Supp. 2d at 574 (“Some of the targets are market-share targets (i.e. targets
based on British Airways’ percentage share of the corporation's U.S.–U.K. flights).
. . . Others are total-revenue targets.”).
62
257 F.3d at 261.
16
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Heathrow airport, were part of an anticompetitive scheme to slow
Virgin’s growth as a competitor.63
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted summary judgment for BA64 and the U.S Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed.65 It first found that Virgin’s
Sherman Act Section 1 claims failed because Virgin failed to show
“actual adverse effects” on consumer welfare.66 It then affirmed the
dismissal of Virgin’s attempted monopolization claim on the grounds
that Virgin failed to show that the incentive agreements resulted in
BA pricing airline tickets below cost—a requirement for predatory
pricing claims.67 In passing, it made the offhand statement quoted at
the beginning of this Article: “These kinds of agreements allow
firms to reward their most loyal customers. Rewarding customer
loyalty promotes competition on the merits.”68
The European Commission,69 General Court,70 and European
Court of Justice (“ECJ”)71 reached a very different conclusion on the
same facts. In two prior cases, Hoffman-La Roche72 and Michelin,73
the ECJ had adopted a presumption that discounts or rebates offered
by dominant firms to induce customer loyalty were incompatible
with Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU. In British Airways, the court
found that the incentives were prima facie anticompetitive because
they had the effect of inducing loyalty to a dominant firm.74 The
court did not cite evidence of actual anticompetitive effects in the
63

257 F.3d at 259.
69 F. Supp. 2d at 571.
65
257 F.3d at 256.
66
Id. at 264.
67
Id. at 265-69.
68
257 F.2d at 265.
69
British Airways PLC / Virgin Enterprises, European Commission Prohibition
Decision (Dec. 13, 1999), http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2000:030:0001:0024:EN:PDF.
70
Case T-219/99 British Airways PLC v. Commission, [2003] ECR II-5917.
71
British Airways v. Commission, Case C-95/04 P (March 15, 2007).
72
Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461 PP8991 (E.C.J.)
73
Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission,
1983 E.C.R. 3461 PP75-86 (E.C.J.)
74
C-95/04 P (affirming General Court’s finding that “the bonus schemes at issue
had a fidelity-building effect capable of producing an exclusionary effect”).
17
64
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sense of higher consumer prices or diminished output, finding that
evidence of actual anticompetitive effects was unnecessary.75 Rather,
in keeping with ECJ precedents, it focused on the generic
exclusionary potential of the loyalty rebates when exercised by
dominant undertakings.76
Having found the incentive rebates to be suspect fidelity-building
devices, the court then considered whether BA had offered an
“objective economic justification” sufficient to overcome the prima
facie presumption of illegality.77 BA argued that the rebates were
objectively justified because they helped BA fill empty airplane seats
and hence contribute toward its high fixed operational costs.78 The
ECJ affirmed the General Court’s rejection of this argument,
essentially finding that only direct cost savings from the loyalty
program were the kinds of objective economic justifications
sufficient to overcome the presumption of illegality for the
deployment of fidelity discounts by dominant firms.79
The Intel case followed on the heels of Virgin/BA. The computer
central processing unit (“CPU”) market has been essentially a
duopoly since the 1990s, with Intel controlling roughly 80% and
Advanced Micro Devices (“AMD”) controlling the other 15 to
20%.80 In the late 1990s, Intel began to offer Original Equipment
Manufacturers (“OEMs”) financial incentives to purchase specified
levels of their CPU requirements—typically around 80 or 85%– from
Intel.81 AMD complained that these loyalty rebates slowed its
market share growth and starved it of the capital needed to invest in
developing new products.82 From the early 2000s and continuing to
some degree until the present, AMD and Intel waged a global
antitrust war over the legal treatment of Intel’s loyalty discounts. To
summarize the headlines briefly, AMD secured early decisions
75

Case C-95/04 P (“[I]t is not necessary to demonstrate that the abuse in question
had a concrete effect on the markets concerned.”).
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
See Daniel A. Crane & Graciella Miralles, Toward a Unified Theory of
Exclusionary Vertical Restraints, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev. 605, 647-49 (2011) (explaining
background to AMD/Intel litigation).
81
Id.
82
Id.
18
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against Intel in Japan and Korea, a favorable decision and €1.06
billion (almost $1.5 billion) fine against Intel from the European
Commission, and a $1.25 billion settlement payment from Intel, and
a complaint from the Federal Trade Commission that Intel quickly
settled.83
Although we have not yet heard the final word from Europe,84 the
Intel case seems to suggest some provisional and fragile
rapprochement between the U.S. and EU treatment of loyalty
discounts—at least at the level of public enforcement. For its part,
the European Commission seemed to back away from the view
expressed in Hoffman La-Roche, Michelin, and BA that loyalty
discounts by dominant firms should be treated as prima facie illegal
and only permitted if the dominant firm can overcome the high
hurdle of proving marginal cost efficiencies. The key turn came in a
December 2008 “Guidance Paper” on application of Article 102’s
prohibition on abuse of dominance, in which the Commission staff
suggested determining whether loyalty discounts are anticompetitive
using a modified predatory pricing analysis, similar to what some
U.S. courts and agencies have suggested.85 The European antitrust
community has understood the Guidance Paper as reflecting a
83

Id. at 648.
As of this writing, Intel was pressing its appeal from the Commission’s decision
in the General Court.
85
Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission’s
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive
exclusionary
conduct
by
dominant
undertakings,
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52009XC0224(01):EN:NO
T (Dec. 2008).
The Commission’s analysis was similar to that in a
contemporaneous report on monopolization released by the U.S. Justice
Department, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of
the
Sherman
Act
§
6(II)
(2008).
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.htm (discussing legal and
economic standard for judging legality of loyalty discounts). Three Commissioners
of the Federal Trade Commission criticized the Justice Department’s report as too
protective of dominant firms. FTC Commissioners React to Department of Justice
Report, “Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/09/section2.shtm (Sept. 8, 2008). The
Obama Antitrust Division withdrew the report in one of its first official acts.
Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law,
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/245710.htm (May 11, 2009).
19
84
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movement in the Commission away from a “form-based” analysis
and toward an “effects-based” or functional economic analysis.86 In
its Prohibition Decision, the Commission began by invoking the
“form-based” precedents (Hoffman La-Roche, Michelin, and BA), but
then conducted an “effects-based” modified predation analysis to
conclude that Intel’s loyalty rebates had an exclusionary effect on
AMD, and hence on competition.87
A few months after the Commission decision, the FTC brought
its own action against Intel.88 If the Europeans had moved a few
yards in the American direction, the Americans moved at few feet in
the European direction. Consistent with U.S. predatory pricing
precedent, the Commission alleged that Intel’s rebates would have
forced AMD to price below cost in order to compete.89 However, the
Commission also gave notice that it intended to push the boundaries
of traditional, pro-defendant predatory pricing law as applied to
loyalty discounts. First, the Commission’s complaint alleged that the
measure of cost below which Intel priced included “average variable
cost plus an appropriate level of contribution towards sunk costs.”90
Since most U.S. courts consider only variable or marginal costs in
predatory pricing cases,91 this was a direct challenge to the
application of a predatory pricing model in bundled discount cases. 92
Second, the Complaint alleged that, while the Commission was
prepared to show that Intel was able to recoup its costs of giving
86

See Neelie Kroes, Member, European Comm'n in Charge of Competition Policy,
Speech at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute: Preliminary Thoughts on Policy
Review of Article 82, at 2 (Sept. 23, 2005), available at http://
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/537 (advocating
an effects-based approach to Article 82 enforcement).
87
See Crane & Miralles, supra n. xxx at 648-49 (describing Commission’s
approach).
88
In re Intel, FTC Docket No. 9341 (Dec. 16, 2009) (Administrative Complaint),
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/091216intelcmpt.pdf.
89
Id. at ¶ 53.
90
Administrative Complaint ¶ 53.
91
III PHILIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST Law §§ 739-40 (2007)
(explaining application of average variable cost test).
92
See Daniel A. Crane, Predation Analysis and the FTC’s Case Against Intel,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1617364 (examining ways in
which FTC’s proposed cost definition faced difficulties given prevailing legal
standards).
20
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loyalty discounts through supracompetitive pricing, recoupment
should not be a mandatory element of an FTC case challenging
loyalty discounts.93 Since recoupment is an element of a predatory
pricing case,94 this statement also signaled the FTC’s intention to
move away from restrictive predation rules and analogies toward a
more interventionist approach toward loyalty discounts. Whether or
not these theories would ultimately have held up the Intel case cannot
inform us, since Intel settled with the Commission a few months
later.95
If Intel signals some convergence between the views of the
current European Commission and FTC, it does little to settle the
issue in the courts where, when push comes to shove, the issue may
ultimately be resolved. At a doctrinal level, the treatment of loyalty
discounts remains polarized, with U.S. courts sometimes following a
strict predatory pricing approach that plaintiffs (whether private or
governmental) will find it hard to meet and the official doctrine of the
EU courts remaining hostile to loyalty discounts by dominant firms.
In the meanwhile, academic commentators continue to develop new
theories about the value and threats of loyalty,96 and private litigants
continue to press their cases in the lower courts in the U.S.97
C. Prior Beliefs, Legal Catechisms, and the Formation of
Antitrust Standards
As noted above, the law governing loyalty discounts remains
unsettled. European law has not caught up with the dramatic shift
from a form-based approach to an effects-based approach tentatively
proposed by the Commission.98 Some U.S. courts have moved in the
direction of predatory pricing rules for loyalty discounts, but many of
93

Administrative Complaint ¶ 53.
Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224
(1993) (“The second prerequisite to holding a competitor liable under the antitrust
laws for charging low prices is a demonstration that the competitor had a
reasonable prospect, or, under § 2 of the Sherman Act, a dangerous probability, of
recouping its investment in below-cost prices.”).
95
FTC Approves Modified Intel Settlement Order,
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/11/intel.shtm (Nov. 2, 2010).
96
See supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx.
97
See supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx.
98
See supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx.
21
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the conservative assumptions in these cases are under attack in
academic literature, and the Supreme Court has not yet weighed in.99
Most of the contests over loyalty discounts have occurred in the last
decade, which, in the glacial movement of antitrust law, is relatively
little time in which to form durable rules. The antitrust law of loyalty
remains up for grabs.
Understanding the likely evolution of antitrust law concerning
loyalty discounts requires some brief observations into how modern
antitrust law is formed in U.S. courts. Although predicated on
statutes, antitrust law evolves in an essentially common-law manner,
as likely intended by its legislative framers.100 That is to say, judges
announce principles based on analogies from precedent but relatively
unconstrained by external sources such as deterministic statutory
language,101 threats of Congressional action to overrule unpopular
results,102 or agency rule-making entitled to some degree of judicial
99

See supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx.
See Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688
(1978) (“Congress ... did not intend the text of the Sherman Act to delineate the full
meaning of the statute or its application in concrete situations. The legislative
history makes it perfectly clear that [Congress] expected the courts to give shape to
the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition.”); I PHILIP
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW P 103d2 (3d ed. 2006) (stating
that the Sherman Act “invest[ed] the federal courts with a jurisdiction to create and
develop an ‘antitrust law’ in the manner of the common law courts”); William F.
Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the “Common Law”
Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 Tex. L. Rev. 661, 663 (1982)(“Congress adopted what
is in essence enabling legislation that has permitted a common-law refinement of
antitrust law through an evolution guided by only the most general statutory
directions.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 544
(1983) (“The statute books are full of laws, of which the Sherman Act is a good
example, that effectively authorize courts to create new lines of common law.”).
101
See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 409 (1978) (describing “open-textured” nature of Sherman Act’s language).
102
In the modern era, Congress has shown little interest in overturning Supreme
Court antitrust precedents, as it has done in many other statutory areas. Following
the Court’s decision in Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877 (2007), which jettisoned a nearly century-old rule of per se illegality for
resale price maintenance, there were Congressional threats of a legislative override.
Leegin-override legislation has passed committees in both houses of Congress, but
22
100
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deference.103 Modern antitrust case law development, if not exactly
free form, is as free from external constraints as any area of Supreme
Court jurisprudence.
When the Supreme Court decides antitrust cases, it of course
adopts rules or multi-factor standards. But these legally structured
liability determinants are often less important to the decision of
future cases than the atmospheric maxims or legal-economic
catechisms that the Court announces in the course of adjudication.
These maxims, which since the Chicago School revolution of the
1970s have increasingly been drawn from economic theory,104
announce a set of baseline perspectives or Bayesian prior beliefs
about the competitive practice under consideration. Their repetition
in future cases serves as a grounding exercise to orient the court’s
thinking and justify its decision.
The best example of this, and the one most relevant to loyalty
discounting, is predatory pricing. In the pre-Chicago era, the courts
and antitrust agencies often viewed aggressive price discounting by
dominant firms with suspicion.105 Aggressive price cutting fell into
what the Nobel laureate Oliver Williamson once referred to
antitrust’s “inhospitability tradition.”106 The ascendant Chicago
has thus far failed to gain traction in the full Congress. Joanna Anderson, Senate
Judiciary Committee Backs Latest Effort to Ban “Vertical Price Fixing,” 11/3/11
CQ Today (Nov. 3, 2011).
103
The Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission have rarely
promulgated substantive antitrust rules. See Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and
Antitrust, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1159, 1199 (2008).
104
See Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 925 (1979) (describing economic origins of the Chicago School).
105
The seminal pre-Chicago case is Utah Pie Co. v. Cont'l Baking Co., 386 U.S.
685 (1967), which condemned aggressive price competition without any showing
of adverse anticompetitive effects.
106
Oliver E. Williamson, Symposium on Antitrust Law and Economics:
Introduction, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 918, 920 (1979); see also Oliver E.
Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the
Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 959
(1979) [hereinafter Vertical Market Restrictions]. Williamson attributed this
tradition to Donald Turner, then-Assistant Attorney General at the Antitrust
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, who was quoted as stating: “I approach
territorial and customer restrictions not hospitably in the common law tradition, but
inhospitably in the tradition of antitrust law.” Williamson, Vertical Market
23
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School, however, largely dismissed the predation theories and argued
for far greater tolerance toward unilateral price competition.107 Over
time, the Supreme Court radically altered the reception that unilateral
price discounts received in the courts, essentially moving them into a
hospitability tradition.108 It did this in part by announcing restrictive
liability rules—the requirement of pricing below an appropriate
measure of cost and the recoupment requirement.109 But the Court
accomplished this revolution without investing much effort into
fleshing out the content of the liability rules. For example, it has still
not decided what is the appropriate measure of cost in a predation
case, an issue on which there has been a circuit split for several
decades.110 Instead, the Court spent much of its time expounding
atmospheric maxims about why predatory pricing was not likely to
be a frequent threat to competition and why punishing it would
threaten the welfare of consumers. The litany is now often intoned
catechistically in predation cases: “predatory schemes are rarely
tried, and even more rarely successful;”111 because ‘cutting prices in
order to increase business often is the very essence of competition
Restrictions,supra, at 959 (quoting N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N, ANTITRUST LAW
SYMPOSIUM 29 (1968) (remarks of Stanley Robinson)).
107
See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH
ITSELF 144-60 (1978) (critiquing predatory pricing theories and suggesting that
predation is unlikely to be a serious problem); John S. McGee, Predatory
Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & Econ. 289, 292 (1980) (arguing that predatory is rare
and generally an irrational business strategy); Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory
Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 282-97 (1981)
(dismissing predation strategies as unlikely to be attempted).
108
Crane, Paradox of Predatory Pricing, supra n. xxx at 3-4.
109
Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222-23 (holding that predatory pricing plaintiffs
must show pricing below an appropriate measure of cost and dangerous probability
that defendant will subsequently recoup its predatory investment through
supracompetitive pricing).
110
On three occasions, the Supreme Court has declined to decide what is the
appropriate measure of cost for predatory pricing cases. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at
222 n.1; Cargill, 479 U.S. at 117-18 n.12; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 584-85 n.8.
111
First intoned in Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589, and repeated in Cargill, 479 U.S. at
121 n.17, 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 343 n.5 (1987), Brooke Group,
509 U.S. at 226, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549
U.S. 312, 323 (2007).
24
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...[;] mistaken inferences ... are especially costly, because they chill
the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect;”112 “Low
prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and
so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten
competition.”113
The power of these kinds of catechisms lies in their ability to
direct a judge’s disposition toward such critical matters as allocations
of burdens of proof, her willingness to dismiss cases, grant summary
judgment, or otherwise relieve juries of cases, and the exercise of her
Daubert gate-keeping function as to expert testimony.114 Predatory
pricing cases have become hard to win not primarily because
plaintiffs cannot come up with theories of below-cost pricing or
recoupment, but because judges have generally begun with a
Supreme Court-mandated prior belief that predatory pricing is an
implausible theory that will often by invoked by inefficient, rentseeking competitors that want to increase rather than decrease
prices.115
If antitrust law proceeds in large part by catechisms, these
catechisms need not be uniformly in favor of dominant firms.
Throughout much of antitrust history, the currents have run the other
way.116 The Post-Chicago movement in antitrust law is beginning to
make in-roads in turning dominant firm practices from the
hospitability tradition to at least neutral ground.117 This is where the
112

First intoned in Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594, and repeated in Cargill, 479 U.S. at
121 n.17, Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226, Verizon Communcs., Inc. v. Law Offices
of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004); Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v.
linkLine Communcs., Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 451 (2009).
113
First intoned in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340
(1990), and repeated in Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 223, State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522
U.S. 3, 15 (1997); Weyerhaeuser, 549 U.S. at 319; linkLine, 555 U.S. at 451.
114
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (requiring courts to
exclude expert testimony that is not the product of reliable principles and methods).
115
See generally Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 Cornell
L. Rev. 1 (2005).
116
Until it was buried in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S.
28, 35 (2006), the Justice Frankfurter’s maxim that “tying arrangements serve
hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition,” Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949).
117
For example, in United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1115 (10th Cir.
2003), the Tenth Circuit announced that, in light of post-Chicago scholarship on
25
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rubber hits the road for loyalty discounts in the U.S. courts. PostChicago theories are chipping away at the Chicago School maxims
that justified non-intervention for unilateral pricing decisions by
dominant firms. As courts sift through these competing assertions,
they will be looking to come up with not only new legal rules—
which may end up being as banal and non-predictive as exclusive
dealing law’s “substantial foreclosure” test118—but with new maxims
or catechisms that express the judiciary’s prior beliefs about the
likelihood that loyalty discounts are help or harm competition and
consumer welfare.
This general pattern is not new, but two conditions of relatively
recent vintage may exercise important influence over the evolution of
loyalty discounting norms. The first is the increasing complexity of
economic models deployed by academic economists and expert
witnesses to describe the potential exclusionary effects and
procompetitive benefits of various competitive practices, including
loyalty discounts. Admittedly, technical economic lingo is not new
to antitrust law.
Formal economic analysis—theoretic and
empirical—has played an important role in shaping antitrust policy
since at least the heyday of Harvard School structuralism in the
1950s and 60s.119 And, the Chicago School that succeeded it was
nominally predicated almost entirely on economic analysis.120 The
difference today is that much of the economic scholarship about
antitrust issues is no longer expressed in readable prose presenting
empirical observations (i.e., firms in concentrated industry earn
higher rates of return on capital) or theoretical ideas (i.e., a firm with
market power in one market would not engage in tying to obtain
power in a complementary market since raising prices in the second
market would reduce demand in the first market). Rather, much of
the progress being made in technical economics relating to antitrust
issues is occurring in papers that engage in complex economic
modeling that the average lawyer or judge is unlikely to read or
predatory pricing, it would no longer approach predatory pricing cases with “the
incredulity that once prevailed.”
118
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (holding that
exclusive dealing contracts are only illegal if the y substantially foreclose
competition in the relevant market).
119
See DANIEL A. CRANE & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE MAKING OF COMPETITION
POLICY: SELECTED SOURCES (forthcoming 2012).
120
Id.
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understand.121 Even when the intuitions behind the models are
plainly explained, lawyers and judges often find themselves unsure of
how much weight to put into any particular model, given the number
of restrictive assumptions made to derive the model’s results.122 As a
group of economists has explained as to models of loyalty
discounting, “[t]he academic literature on loyalty discounts and
exclusive dealing demonstrates that the welfare effects of these
practices are ambiguous and that market details determine the
direction of the effect.”123
Given this reality, the creation of new legal catechisms is
especially important. Since judges will rarely have the ability, time,
or disposition to sort through the competing models and theoretical
claims on a case-by-case basis (much less submit them unvarnished
to juries), they will increasingly look to the catechisms to frame their
decision. A maxim like the Second Circuit’s Virgin Atlantic
statement that rewarding customer loyalty through discounts is
procompetitive and beneficial might have more influence in the
decision of a case than ten new models showing that loyalty
discounts can exclude competitors or soften competition.
Conversely, judicial adoption of a maxim that loyalty discounts are
121

Michael R. Baye & Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for
Generalist Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity and Judicial Training on
Appeals, 54 J. L. & Econ. 1 (2011) (reporting empirical study suggesting that some
antitrust cases are too complicated for generalist judges).
122
See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, 78
Antitrust L. J. 67, 103 (2012) (noting, as to models of exclusionary effects from
market share discounts in GPO contracts, that “the assumptions in these models are
restrictive and they cannot be applied without significant risk of a false signal in
situations that deviate from their assumption”); Joshua D. Wright, Abandoning
Antitrust’s Chicago Obsession: The Case for Evidence-Based Antitrust, 78
Antitrust L. J. 241, 241 (2012) (discussing “model selection problem” arising from
“endless number of theoretical models” of causes and welfare consequences of
different kinds of competitive behaviors). See also Timothy J. Brennan, Is
Competition the Entry Barrier? Consumer and Total Welfare Benefits of Bundling
(AEI/Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 05-08
2005) (showing large array of very different effects that can extrapolated from
models making different assumptions as to product bundling).
123
Assaf Eilat, Jith Jayaratne, Janusz A. Ordover & Greg Shaffer, How Loyalty
Discounts Can Perversely Discourage Discounting: Comment, CPI Antitrust
Chron., Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring 2010).
27
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often just concealed disloyalty penalties—a subject explored in the
next Part—could have similar power in predisposing the decision of a
case, even one in which there was not strong evidence that the
discounts functioned to penalize disloyalty. Hence, some of the
highest yield in the current debates over loyalty discounts will come
from enshrining pro- or anti-loyalty maxims in the catechisms of law.
The second relatively new condition—and one that is probably,
for now, less important than the first—is the growing possibility of
antitrust comparativism. For most of the Sherman Act’s 120-year
history, antitrust law was largely an American peculiarity.124 The EU
arose as a second developed antitrust system in the 1980s, but, until
fairly recently, many or most in the U.S. antitrust community viewed
EU antitrust law as either primitively formalistic or idiosyncratic
because of the European goals of internal market creation.125 But
now, particularly with the ascendance of effects-based economic
reasoning, European antitrust law has the potential to provide a
serious intellectual counterweight to U.S. antitrust law. Of course,
the citation of foreign law precedents in U.S. domestic law decisions
remains controversial,126 but it may be less objectionable to consult
foreign legal precedents that are essentially developing economic
common law in the manner of Sherman Act jurisprudence than, say,
deciding on the meaning of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment. And there is the additional fact that
big antitrust cases are increasingly played out on a global scale, with
124

ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID & DIANE P. WOOD, TRADE
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 6 (6th ed. 2010) (discussing period when
antitrust was an American peculiarity and subsequent growth of antitrust regimes
around the world).
125
See Spencer Weber Waller & Robert Stoner, Economists Abroad, 15 SPGAntitrust 66 (2001), reviewing SIMON BISHOP AND MIKE WALKER THE ECONOMICS
OF EC COMPETITION LAW (1999) (discussing popular view ‘that EU competition
law is an arid formalistic system of rules devoid of economic analysis”); Josef
Drexel, Real Knowledge is to Know the Extent of One’s Own Ignorance: On the
Consumer Harm Approach in Innovation-Related Competition Cases, 76 Antitrust
L. J. 677, 697 (2010) (discussing how TFEU goals of enhancing economic
integration may push EU law away from consumer welfare goals).
126
See Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, The Law of Nations, and Citations of
Foreign Law: The Lessons of History, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 1335, 1335-36 (2007)
(discussing controversy around citation of foreign legal decisions in U.S.
constitutional cases).
28
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agencies and courts in multiple jurisdictions plying over the same
controversies between the same parties. Recall that the Intel case
proceeded in Japan, Korea, and Europe before decision at the FTC.127
In this environment, U.S. courts will find it increasingly difficult to
ignore antitrust developments in the courts and agencies of the
United States’ important trading partners.
It is with these background conditions that the formation of
antitrust policy over loyalty discounting will likely play out. Unable
or unwilling to process a large number of complex economic models,
courts will form judgments based on which theories, in their
simplified forms, seem most intuitively plausible. These judgments
probably will be internalized in the legal system as maxims similar in
style (although not necessarily in orientation) to those deployed in
predatory pricing law. As judges make these decisions, they will
increasingly be influenced by developments abroad, either because
they will take cognizance of foreign cases or because the learning
from those cases will infiltrate the U.S. antitrust agency positions,
parties’ litigation positions, and scholarly literature coming before
the courts.
II. DISLOYALTY PENALITIES AND COMPETITION SOFTENING THEORIES
This Article aims to provide a limited defense of loyalty
discounts—to argue in favor of maxims that suggest a favorable
judicial disposition toward such discounts. To that end, this Part
responds to the two theories positing that loyalty incentives can harm
consumer welfare even without excluding rivals: first, that loyalty
discounts are often just disguised disloyalty penalties and, second,
that the deployment of loyalty provisions softens competition.
Because these theories challenge the essential premise of loyalty
discounting—that these are real discounting mechanisms—they have
the potential to turn into anti-loyalty maxims with the power
substantially to erode the use of loyalty-enhancing discounts.
However, neither theory is sufficiently robust or generalizable to
serve as the basis for adoption of a new legal maxim.
A. Loyalty Incentives as Disloyalty Penalties

127

Supra n. xxx at xxx.
29
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Most antitrust experts would agree that loyalty incentives can
have long-run exclusionary effects by discouraging customers from
switching purchases to rival suppliers, starving the rivals of needed
revenues, creating a less competitive market, giving the loyaltyinsistent seller market power, and hence enabling that seller to raise
prices above competitive levels.128 However, consistent with the
Second Circuit’s observation in Virgin Atlantic that rebates to loyal
customers are a form of reward,129 many courts and commentators
have assumed that the potential long-run threat to competition from
loyalty discounts must be balanced against the short-run benefit to
customers from the lower price granted for their fidelity.130 This
view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on
predatory pricing, which characterizes the short-run pricing discount
offered by a dominant firm as a substantial benefit to consumers that
should make courts cautious about imposing antitrust liability based
on the potential that such pricing could eventually exclude rivals and
prevent monopolistic pricing at a later time.131 Much of the
128

Even the Bush Administration’s monopolization report, which as noted was
roundly criticized as too protective of dominant firms, acknowledged this potential.
Single Firm Conduct, supra n. xxx at 6(II) ([A]s with predatory pricing, singleproduct loyalty discounts may be anticompetitive in certain circumstances, such as
where the resulting price of all units sold to a customer is below an appropriate
measure of cost. Further, commentators and panelists generally agree that even
where a single-product loyalty discount is above cost when measured against all
units, such a discount may in theory produce anticompetitive effects, especially if
customers ‘must carry a certain percentage of the leading firm’s products’ and the
discount is structured to induce purchasers to buy all or nearly all needs beyond
that ‘uncontestable’ percentage from the leading firm.”)
129
See supra text accompanying note xxx – xxx.
130
See, e.g., Southeast Missouri Hospital, 642 F.3d at 615 (noting that cutting
prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition” and
repeating Supreme Court’s caution on acceptance of unfair pricing claims);
Concord Boat, 207 F.3d at 1060 (quoting, in context of market share discount
analysis, Supreme Court statement “[l]ow prices benefit consumers regardless of
how those prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not
threaten competition. Hence, they cannot give rise to antitrust injury”) (citation
omitted).
131
Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223
(1993) (explaining that price discounting is generally beneficial to consumers and
30
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hospitability tradition toward unilaterally determined prices comes
from a belief that “[l]ow prices benefit consumers regardless of how
they are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do
not threaten competition.”132
A growing line of criticism charges that loyalty incentives are
often not price discounts at all but rather disguised taxes on
disloyalty.133 Although this critique has mostly appeared in academic
literature, it is beginning to appear in judicial decisions as well. For
example, in affirming a plaintiff’s jury verdict based on a claim of
exclusion through loyalty discounts, the Third Circuit recently
described threatened losses of market share discounts as “financial
penalties.”134 The court relied on this characterization in upholding a
jury verdict finding that the defendant’s market share discounts were
illegal even though the defendant had not priced above cost. 135 The
court apparently believed that penalizing disloyalty was different in
kind for purposes of antitrust analysis than rewarding loyalty.
Analytically, whether something is a loyalty discount or
disloyalty penalty depends critically on the baseline, just as the
distinction between rewards and punishments depends on the
expressing concerns about chilling such price discounting through excessive
predatory pricing liability).
132
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990).
133
See Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not
Predatory—And the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 Yale
L. J. 681, 698 n. 53 (2003) (“If loyalty rebates were never illegal unless the
resulting price were below cost, then any firm could immunize its exclusivedealing agreements from antitrust scrutiny by the simple expedient of inflating the
price and then offering a rebate conditioned on exclusivity.”); Joseph Farrell,
Director, Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Problems with Loyalty
Pricing, address at the Fourth Annual Searle Research Symposium on Antitrust
Economics and Competition Policy, Northwestern University (Sept. 23, 2011)
(describing loyalty discounts as a tax on purchases from competitors); Aaron Edlin
& Joseph Farrell, Freedom to Trade and the Competitive Process, NBER Working
Paper No. 16818 (Feb. 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16818 (describing
loyalty incentives in multi-product discounting context as taxes on trading with an
alternative supplier); Fiona Scott-Morton, Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, Contracts that Reference Rivals, (April 5, 2012), at 9
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/281965.pdf (discussing literature
showing that loyalty discounting serves as a tax on purchasing from rivals);
Jacobson, supra n. xxx at 2 (“In some instances, moreover, the ‘discount’ might in
fact be a disguised penalty for ‘disloyal’ buyers.”).
134
ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 277 (3d Cir. 2012).
135
Id.
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baseline.136 The “discounts as penalties” assertion assumes that the
baseline price—the price the customer would receive if she refused
the loyalty discount—is an artificially inflated penalty price and that
the loyalty discount merely brings the price back to the profitmaximizing monopoly level. For purposes of stylizing the disloyalty
penalty claim, assume that the price the customer would receive
absent the loyalty incentive is x and the loyalty incentive is 1. Under
a discount or reward view, the customer who meets the loyalty
criteria pays a price of x-1, and hence improves her position as
compared to the world with no loyalty incentive (putting aside the
potential of long-run exclusionary effects). Under the penalty view,
however, the seller increases his price to x+1 and then offers a
“discount” of 1 in exchange for loyalty. The customer who accepts
the discount achieves merely the but-for price absent the loyalty
discount; the customer who refuses it pays a disloyalty penalty of 1.
The penalty view, if widely accepted, would have severe
consequences for antitrust policy concerning loyalty discounts. It
would alter the baseline view of loyalty incentives as price
concessions that benefit consumers and should only be prohibited if
they have long-run exclusionary effects. This would shift loyalty
incentives out of the broad safety zone for non-predatory unilaterally
determined prices established in existing case law, just as the Third
Circuit did in ZF Meritor.137
But the view that loyalty discounts are actually disloyalty
penalties encounters significant analytical difficulties. In most
circumstances, it is doubtful that a seller can successfully threaten or
implement a disloyalty penalty without impairing its own interests far
more than those of its customers. Since a disloyalty penalty would
usually inflict far more loss to the seller than to the buyer, it is not
plausible that sellers routinely impose disloyalty penalties.
To see why, begin with a seller in a competitive market. Such
a seller clearly cannot impose a disloyalty penalty on the customer
who chooses to buy forbidden fruits from the seller’s rival. In this
136

See Daryl J. Levinson, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 345, 377 , 377 n. 154 (2003) (observing
that whether something is a punishment or a reward depends on the baseline); see
also McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 46 (2002) (“The answer to the question
whether the government is extending a benefit or taking away a
privilege rests entirely in the eye of the beholder.”).
137
Supra n. xxx.
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example, x is a competitive market price. If a seller in a competitive
market raises its baseline price above the competitive price,
customers can simply switch to rival sellers. If the seller offers to
reduce its price back to the competitive price if the customer remains
loyal, that will not work either. From the customer’s perspective, a
requirement of loyalty is an impairment of its freedom to mix and
match its purchases from different sellers as it prefers. The seller’s
offer of a price of x conditioned on loyalty is less attractive than a
competitor’s offer of a price of x not conditioned on loyalty. The
only way that the seller can successfully use a loyalty incentive is to
provide a true discount from x—to go back to the standard
assumption that a loyalty incentive results in x-1.138
Now consider a monopoly seller. Assuming that he has
exercised his monopoly power, x will be the profit-maximizing
monopoly price.139 Any disloyalty penalty he would try to set would
have to be above that price, and hence by definition be less profitable
to the monopolist than x. The mere fact that the monopolist might
threaten to charge an unprofitable price in order to coerce compliance
is not itself an objection to the disloyalty penalty view. The basic
model of monopoly pricing posits that the monopolist threatens
something unprofitable to itself—withholding sales above marginal
cost—if the customer refuses to pay the monopoly price.140 The
difference here is that the monopolist who is already charging the
profit-maximizing monopoly price is operating in the elastic portion
of his demand curve.141 At this price, customers are willing to
consider other products or services as substitutes for the monopolist’s
product or service. Indeed, the very reason that the monopolist does
138

It is a standard assumption in the economic literature that the seller must pay the
buyer to accept an exclusivity condition. Ramusen, Ramseyer & Wiley, supra n.
xxx at xxx (discussing price monopolist must pay buyers to accept an exclusivity
commitment upon the threat of new entry).
139
W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS
OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 82 (4th ed. 2005) (explaining how monopolist
sets a profit-maximizing price by equating marginal cost with marginal revenue).
140
Mancur Olson, Collective Action, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 474 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1994); Mancur Olson, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION (2d ed. 1971) [MORE].
141
William H. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
Harv. L. Rev. 937, 961 (1981) (explaining that “every monopolist faces an elastic
demand [] at its profit-maximizing output and price).
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not charge a price higher than x is that, if it did, customers would
substitute to other suppliers.
If the monopolist threatens a price above his profitmaximizing monopoly price, he is threatening to damage himself far
more than he harms the customer. Most or all customers who reject
the monopolist’s insistence on loyalty will not actually incur the
disloyalty penalty. They will substitute to other products.142
Although they would prefer to purchase from the monopolist at x, the
difference to them in utility between buying the monopolist’s product
at x and substituting to other products is small. The harm to
consumers from calling the monopolist’s bluff is slight.
By contrast, the harm to the monopolist of losing customers
to substitution to other products is large. The sales that the
monopolist makes at the profit-maximizing, elastic portion of its
demand curve are its most profitable. When customers substitute to
other products, the monopolist loses not only market share, but sales
at a monopoly price. Further, by inducing its customers to substitute
to goods or services the customers did not consider good substitutes
at a price of x, the monopolist runs the risk of losing the customer
entirely or forever. Customers who experiment with the goods or
services of a rival may decide that they prefer the rival’s offerings.
Even if the monopolist eventually stops threatening a disloyalty
penalty, they may choose not to return.
Monopolists who play a disloyalty penalty game in the elastic
part of their demand curve will usually be taking an unwise risk. By
pricing at the profit-maximizing monopoly level, they fully spent
their market power. The threat of a yet higher price will usually be
hollow.
Einer Elhauge, one of the leading proponents of the disloyalty
penalty theory, has responded to this view that the monopolist lacks
the power credibly to threaten an above x disloyalty penalty.143
Elhauge claims that this argument misunderstands the fundamental
premise of monopoly pricing and, that if it were true, “the seller
threat under monopoly pricing would not be credible because, if the
buyer threatened not to buy the product unless the monopolist
142

This is mathematically a function of the fact that the profit-maximizing
monopoly price is the highest price the monopolist can charge without seeing its
customers substitute to other products.
143
Einer Elhauge, The Failed Resurrection of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory,
Competition Policy Int’l, Spring 2010 155 (2009).
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lowered the price below the monopoly price to some above-cost
level, the monopolist would find it more profitable to sell at that
above-cost price than to forego sales and lose all profits to that
buyer.”144 Since we know that monopoly pricing actually works,
both in theory and in practice, Elhauge claims that there must be a
fundamental error in the premise that threatening a price above the
monopoly level will not work.145 Elhauge argues that the buyer who
is threatened with a disloyalty penalty will accede to loyalty so long
as her surplus from accepting the monopolist’s demand exceeds her
surplus from rejecting it.146 Even if the customer is harmed less than
the monopolist by the imposition of the threatened disloyalty penalty,
collective action problems prevent her from calling the monopolist’s
bluff.147
Three responses are in order. First, the consumer’s surplus
may not be greater if she stays loyal to the monopolist at price x and
subject to a loyalty restraint rather than switching to a different
supplier.
The imposition of an onerous contractual term is
economically equivalent to a price increase.148 If, as hypothesized, x
without a loyalty constraint is the profit-maximizing monopoly price,
then a price of x plus loyalty constraint, which is a cost to the buyer
insofar as it deprives her of her freedom of choice, is an effective
price increase. Under standard economic assumptions, a price
increase above the profit-maximizing monopoly price causes
customers to substitute to new products and services because doing
so increases their surplus.149 Hence, customers will find it preferable
to substitute to other goods or services rather than to pay the full
monopoly price and become subject to a restrictive loyalty
requirement.
Second, even if the customer would enjoy slightly more
surplus by purchasing at x (with the loyalty restraint) than by
substituting to a rival’s offering, it is far from clear that collective
action problems will make her unwilling to call the monopolist’s
bluff. The asymmetries between the losses to the monopolist and to
the customer from customer substitution are large. If the customer
144

Id. at 178.
Id.
146
Id. at 177.
147
Id.
148
DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 57 (4th ed. 2005).
149
Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in
Antitrust Law, 76 Geo. L.J. 241, 256 (1987).
145
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realizes that she has little to lose by calling the monopolist’s bluff
and that the monopolist has much to lose, she may push back on the
monopolist’s demand.
Finally, it bears returning to the point made a few moments
ago that a seller in a competitive market cannot impose a disloyalty
penalty. Economists and antitrust scholars have long recognized that
the monopolist who has charged a profit-maximizing monopoly price
has effectively priced itself into a competitive market and faces
competition from products that would not be substitutes at a lower
price point. The classic exposition of this point arises in the context
of a fundamental error in economic reasoning—widely known as the
“cellophane fallacy”—made in a Supreme Court case on market
definition in the DuPont case.150 In DuPont, the question was
whether the relevant market should be considered just cellophane, in
which event DuPont would have a monopoly, or whether there was a
wider market including other flexible packaging materials like
Pliofilm, glassine, foil, polyethelylene, waxed paper, and Saran
wrap.151 The Court concluded that the market included all flexible
wrapping materials because there was evidence of substantial crosselasticity of demand152 between cellophane and the other materials.153
As numerous courts and commentators have pointed out since, the
fact that consumers considered cellophane and other flexible
wrapping materials substitutes at prevailing prices did not negate the
possibility that cellophane was its own relevant market.154 If DuPont
had monopolized the cellophane market and then raised the price of
150

U.S. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1965).
Id. at 380.
152
Cross-elasticity of demand refers to the increase in demand for one product
caused by an increase in the price of another. F.M SCHERER & DAVID
ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, Third Ed.
75 (3d. ed. 1990).
153
351 U.S. at 400.
154
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 128 (1976);
ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Market Power Handbook: Competition Law and
Economic Foundations 59-60 (2005); Jonathan Baker, Market Definition: An
Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 162-65 (2007); Lawrence J.
White, Market Power and Market Definition in Monopolization Cases: A
Paradigm is Missing, in ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND
POLICY (Wayne D. Collins ed., A.B.A. Sec. of Antitrust Law 2008); Robert
Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1814 (1990); 2B Areeda & Hovenkamp, supra note xxx, ¶
539; Gene C. Schaerr, The Cellophane Fallacy and the Justice Department's
Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers, 94 Yale L.J. 670 (1985).
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cellophane to the profit-maximizing monopoly level, other flexible
wrapping materials would become good substitutes for cellophane at
the monopoly price.
As the cellophane case illustrates, the monopolist who has
charged the profit-maximizing price is operating in a competitive-like
environment, one where the monopolist faces meaningful constraints
on its pricing and output decisions because consumers have
meaningful choices at prevailing prices. In such a circumstance, the
monopolist has no more power to threaten a disloyalty penalty than
any other seller in an ordinary competitive market.
Thus far, we have considered firms in competitive markets
and monopolists charging the profit-maximizing monopoly price.
Three more circumstances warrant mention: sellers with some
degree of market power in oligopoly markets, sellers of any kind
engaging in price discrimination, and monopolists engaged in limit
pricing.
Putting aside for a moment the competition softening theories
discussed in the next part, the case of the oligopolist is just a weaker
version of the case of the monopolist. Like the monopolist, the
oligopolist maximizes its profits by equating marginal revenue to
marginal cost and is constrained to raise its price any further because
consumers will substitute to rival sellers.155 Oligopolists, like
monopolists, price in the elastic part of their demand curve where
they have essentially spent all of their market power. Indeed, under a
conventional kinked demand curve model of oligopoly pricing, the
demand above the prevailing oligopoly price is so elastic that the
oligopolist who unilaterally raises his price will lose nearly all of her
sales.156 Hence, absent collusion between oligopolists (discussed
next), an oligopolist cannot credibly threaten a disloyalty penalty if it
is already charging the profit-maximizing oligopoly price.
The same is true of a firm that is engaging in price
discrimination—charging different prices to different buyers based
on their different willingness to pay.157 As to disloyalty penalties,
155

DANIEL S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 457-58 (6th ed.
2005) (discussing oligopoly pricing).
156
In the model, the kink occurs because each firm believes that if it raises its price
above the current price none of its competitors will follow suit. Conversely, each
oligopolist also believes that if it lowers its price, all other firms will also lower
theirs. But see George J. Stigler, The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid
Prices, 55 J. POL. ECON. 432 (1947) (providing theoretical criticisms of the
kinked curve model).
157
Pindyck & Rubinfeld, supra n. xxx at 383 (defining price discrimination).
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price discrimination is just a microcosm of monopoly pricing. The
seller sets its price to each buyer based on its perception of the
buyer’s maximum willingness to pay.158 Instead of having a unified
x, we have instead a series of xs corresponding to buyers’ separate
reservation prices. If the monopolist imposes a loyalty condition on
top of x, he will lose the sale because he has exceeded the buyer’s
reservation price. Loyalty prices must thus be below x in order to
stick.
Finally, we come to the firm with market power that is
engaging in limit pricing—a price below the short-run profitmaximizing price designed to discourage new entry or substitution to
rivals.159 This is the one circumstance where the seller might
realistically threaten a disloyalty penalty above x. By holding back
from the profit-maximizing monopoly price, the seller has reserved
some of its market power and can hence impose a penalty above x
without triggering substitution to rivals and the loss of profitable
sales. Still, even this strategy will be risky for the limit-pricing seller
who, by definition is concerned that approaching the monopoly price
will facilitate new entry or the expansion of competitors.
In sum, it is not impossible for sellers to threaten disloyalty
penalties, just risky and unlikely in most circumstances. As a
baseline view or Bayesian prior belief, it is far more likely that most
loyalty discounts are true discounts—prices below x.
B. Competition Softening
A second strand of the anti-loyalty discount literature attacks
loyalty inducement as a means of softening competition between
oligopolists. Competition softening refers to the effect resulting from
the adoption of practices by one or more oligopolists that deter their
rivals from competing as aggressively as they otherwise would.160
158

Id. at 383-93.
See Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete
Information: An Equilibrium Analysis, 50 Econometrica 443, 444-45 (1982); Joe
Bain, A Note on Pricing in Monopoly and Oligopoly, 39 Am. Econ. Rev. 448, 454
(1949); F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 356-66 (3d ed. 1990); JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 367-74 (1992); Viscusi, supra n. xxx at 177-90.;
Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AMER. ECON. REV. 241,
247-48 (1940).
160
Kaplow & Shapiro, supra n. xxx at xxx.
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Examples of practices that have been accused of softening
competition include contracts that reference rivals,161 resale price
maintenance,162 product differentiation,163 price-matching clauses,164
and most favored nations clauses.165 Unlike theories that rely on the
exclusion of a rival to produce anticompetitive effects, competition
softening theories allow for entry and competition by rivals, but with
diminished incentives to engage in aggressive price competition.
Commentators have postulated that loyalty discounts can have
competition softening effects.166 Elhauge and Wickelgren offer the
fullest explanation.167 In their model, when a monopolist reacts to the
possibility of new entry by offering a loyalty discount and this results
in some buyers who are committed to the monopolist and other
buyers who are not and therefore are “free,” the monopolist faces a
diminished incentive to match the new entrant’s prices for “free”
buyers since that would further undermine the monopolist’s price to

161

Interview with Fiona Scott Morton, DAAG for Economic Analysis at the DOJ,
26-SPG Antitrust 14, 17 (2012) (asserting that contracts that reference rivals can
both exclude new entrants and soften competition).
162
Avishalom Tor & William J. Rinner, Behavioral Antitrust: A New Approach to
the Rule of Reason After Leegin, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 805, 812 (2011); Patrick Rey
& Joseph Stiglitz, The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition, 26
RAND J. Econ. 431, 432 (1995).
163
JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 286 (1988) ( “Firms
want to differentiation to soften price competition.”).
164
Stephen C. Salop, Practices That (Credibly) Facilitate Oligopoly Coordination,
in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MARKET
STRUCTURE 279-82 (Joseph E. Stiglitz & G. Frank Mathewson eds., Macmillan
1986).
165
Aaron S. Edlin, Do Guaranteed-Low-Price Policies Guarantee High Prices,
and Can Antitrust Rise to the Challenge?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 528 (1997);
Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints with Horizontal Consequences: Competitive
Effects of “Most-Favored-Customer” Clauses, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 517
(1996); Thomas E. Cooper, Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion,
17 RAND J. Econ. 377 (1986).
166
See Faella, supra n. xxx at 381 (discussing potential of antitrust claim based on
competition-softening effects of loyalty discounts).
167
Elhauge & Wickelgren, Anti-competitive Exclusion, supra n. xxx at 3.
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committed buyers.168 Elhauge and Wickelgren believe that this
would occur because they understand the loyalty discount as a
discount off of the price offered to buyers who did not agree to the
loyalty contract—what is often referred to as the list price.169 They
apparently assume that the incumbent would have to respond to the
new entrant’s solicitation of free buyers by lowering its list price,
which would trigger an unprofitable reduction of its prices to its
committed buyers as well.
This assumption is counterfactual, or at least not generalizable.
There is nothing to say that a firm offering loyalty discounts to
committed buyers has to lower its list price to attract free buyers
when an entrant begins to compete for their business. In most
interactions between corporate buyers and sellers, list prices are
understood to be nominal—the starting place for further negotiation
and discounting.170 Prices are set to individual buyers by a
combination of terms, discounts, rebates, incentives, and side deals.
Consider two examples. First, consider a typical pricing structure
for a medical device—in this case a catheter.171 A hospital that wants
to buy catheters will usually belong to at least one GPO, but often it
will decide to join several GPOs in order to be able to select the best
starting prices it can on a product-by-product basis.172 Access to a
GPO contract generally involves no commitment by the buyer to
purchase anything from the seller.173 Often, a GPO contract will list
168

Id. at 3 (“Price-matching clauses instead involve seller commitments to match
rival prices, whereas loyalty discounts involve no such seller commitment to match
and indeed have the opposite effect of discouraging sellers from matching rival
prices for free buyers.”).
169
Id. at 8 n.10 (“[A]greeing to a loyalty discount simply means that the buyer
receives a discount from the price (often called a ‘list price’) offered to buyers who
did not agree to a loyalty contract.”).
170
See, e.g., St. Francis Med. Ctr. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 657 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1078
(E.D. Mo. 2009) (describing GPO prices as “helpful in establishing the market
price for a particular product and in establishing a starting point for negotiations for
lower-priced commodity products.”).
171
The following facts are largely taken from St. Francis Medical, 657 F. Supp. 2d
at 1069.
172
Id. at 1079 (noting that “hospitals can often belong to more than one GPO and
often switch from one GPO to another’”).
173
Id.
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a number of sellers of the same product from whom the hospital can
choose to buy.174 Prices under the GPO contract are ascertained by
tiers that combine volume and market share requirements—for
example, a requirement that the hospital buy at least $100,000 and
85% of its requirements within the product category from the
vendor.175 Sometimes, the more advantageous tiers require that the
hospital purchase from the seller across multiple product lines, thus
injecting an element of bundling into the equation.176 Although a
member of the GPO is entitled to purchase under the GPO contract,
nothing requires the hospital to do so. Hospitals may, and often do,
elect to negotiate directly with suppliers.177 Even hospitals that buy
under GPO contracts sometimes negotiate side-deals for extra
discounts or rebates on top of the GPO contracts. GPO contracts do
not force hospitals to purchase in any particular way, nor do they
guarantee that the manufacturer will not offer other customers lower
prices outside of the GPO contract.
Or consider the way that Intel set its computer chip prices to
OEMs, as described in the European Commission’s prohibition
decision. Like the medical device manufacturers, Intel started with a
“Customer Authorized Price,” essentially a list price, which then
became a target for OEMs to dicker for price reductions.178 Intel then
offered a series of discounting, rebating, or funding possibilities
based on a variety of criteria such as the introduction of new
technologies or an OEM’s efforts to promote Intel products.179 These
were just Intel’s formal pricing programs. When it came to real
pricing, Intel negotiated individually with OEMs and retailers over
tailored pricing concessions. For example, Dell received discounts or
rebates pursuant to a program formally structured by Intel for Dell,
various short-term price concession agreements, and one-off deals.180
As these examples illustrate, corporate-to-corporate price setting
is rarely as simple as setting a list price and a schedule of discounts
174

Id. (reporting that the Premier GPO included four competitors selling catheters
in its GPO contract).
175
Id. at 1080.
176
Id. at 1080-81.
177
Id. at 1081-82.
178
Intel Prohibition Decision, supra n. xxx at ¶ 175.
179
Id. at ¶¶ 177-78.
180
Id.
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for loyal customers. Sellers and buyers—both committed and free—
constantly bargain over price and loyalty, adjusting their bargains as
market and competitive conditions change. Effective prices are often
hidden under layers upon layers of contracts, schedules, side-letters,
and one-off pricing deals.
Given these conditions, it is difficult to see how loyalty
discounting softens competition or contributes to oligopolistic pricing
coordination. When new firms or technologies enter the market, all
buyers—whether committed or uncommitted—will scramble to
deploy their added leverage to exact additional concessions from the
monopolist seller. The monopolist need not respond by offering a
uniform set of prices and pricing concessions for loyal and disloyal
customers. Rather, it will continue to do what it did before there was
new entry—try to exact the maximum price it can from each
customer given market realities and try to disguise its most favorable
prices to its customers with the greatest buying power so that other
customers will not clamor for similar discounts.
Further idiosyncrasies with Elhauge and Wickelgren’s model
render it inapplicable to the large majority of recently contested
loyalty discount cases. They assume a market with an incumbent
monopolist and only one potential rival,181 a scenario that matches
virtually none of the recently contested loyalty discount cases.182
They assume that a loyalty contract entails a commitment by the
buyer to purchase 100% of its requirements from the seller.183 But in
most contemporary loyalty discount situations, the buyer can achieve
the seller’s best price by buying some lesser amount than its full
requirements from the seller.184 For example, in Concord Boat,
customers obtained the maximum market share discount by buying
70% of their boat engine requirements from the defendant,
Brunswick.185 Intel generally required computer manufacturers to
181

Elhauge & Wickelgren, supra n. xxx at 42.
See supra text accompanying notes xxx - xxx.
183
Id. at 8 (positing that “buyers commit to buy only from the incumbent in
exchange for receiving a discount . . off the price that [the incumbent] offers to
buyers who do not sign the contract”).
184
See supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx.
185
207 F.3d at 1044. Of note, when Brunswick attempted to increase the loyalty
level to 95% in 1994, its effort was beaten back “due to serious backlash from boat
builders.” Id. at 1044-45.
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make 80%-95% of their purchases from Intel to secure a loyalty
rebate.186 In the GPO cases, customers generally maximize their
loyalty discount with a purchase of 80-85% of their requirements
from the seller and can still obtain loyalty discounts at rates as low as
50%.187 R.J. Reynolds required an 85% market share for its best
price.188 The fact that loyalty discounts are often awarded for less
than full loyalty is significant, because smaller rivals or new entrants
have an opportunity to obtain significant sales from customers
without increasing the price the customer pays for its purchases from
the dominant seller.189 Finally, although Elhauge and Wickelgren
consider models where the customer contractually commits to
purchase under the loyalty discount program and ones where the
customer can obtain the loyalty discount without making any ex ante
commitment, they obtain much stronger results when the buyer is
required to make an ex ante commitment.190 As already noted, a

186

Paul Jones, American Antitrust Jurisprudence Applied to European Commission
v. Intel, 7 B.Y.U. Int’l L. & Mgmt. Rev. 52, 55-56 (2010) (summarizing Intel’s
market share discount provisions to OEMs).
187
See Southeast Missouri Hospital, 642 F.3d at 610-11 (reporting that hospitals
achieved the maximum market share rebate at 85% of their catheter requirements
and received loyalty rebates for purchasing as few as 50% of their requirements
from C.R. Bard);
188
477 F.3d at 858.
189
Greg Shaffer and Zhijun Chen have argued that partial exclusive dealing can
threaten competition even more than pure exclusive dealing since the monopolist
must pay customers to enter into exclusive dealing relationships and can do so
more cheaply by purchasing only partial loyalty. Zhijun Chen & Greg Shaffer,
Naked Exclusion and Minimum-Share Requirements, Presentation at University of
East Anglia (June 2010), available at
http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107590/greg_shaffer_new_slides
.pdf. While their model is intriguing as an explanation for how monopolists might
afford a campaign to exclude rivals, it does not respond to the observation that
partial exclusivity commitments foreclose less of the market than pure exclusive
dealing and therefore may leave rivals room to enter or expand in the market. See
Daniel A. Crane & Graciella Miralles, Toward a Unified Theory of Exclusionary
Vertical Restraints, 84 S. Cal. L. Rev. 605, 638-46 (2011) (discussing economic
meaning of exclusive dealing law’s substantial foreclosure requirement).
190
Id. at 27-40.
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buyer commitment to future loyalty was not at issue in mot of the
contemporary loyalty discount cases.
There is another peculiarity about thinking of loyalty discounts as
competition-softening devices.
Competition-softening theories
generally assume that the function of a competition-softening device
is to facilitate supra-competitive pricing by oligopolists.191
Oligopolists generally benefit from competition-softening devices at
the expense of consumers. If a loyalty discount operated to make the
incumbent monopolist less willing to match a new entrant’s prices to
“free” customers, then this should benefit the new entrant. In that
case, we should not expect to see many cases in which smaller rivals
complain about their dominant competitor’s use of loyalty discounts.
But that is exactly what we observe in virtually all of the recently
contested loyalty discount cases.192 The fact that competitors are the
chief complainants about loyalty discounts does not mean that these
devices are not anticompetitive—they could still be exclusionary.
But it does mean that they are unlikely to be competition softening
devices, as that concept is usually understood.
In sum, it is possible to create models in which the use of loyalty
clauses softens competition. It is unlikely, however, that these
models are useful in describing the key questions that antitrust law
needs to address today.
Even if the disloyalty penalty and competition softening claims
are not generalizable, this does not mean that loyalty incentives are
always pro-competitive. Rather, it means that loyalty discounts
should continue to be evaluated for exclusionary effects—generally,
the foreclosure of rivals’ ability to compete in the market.193
III. LOYALTY AND THE CUSTOMER PERSPECTIVE
The previous Part responded to two criticisms of loyalty
discounting and hence played a defensive role with respect to loyalty
incentives. This final Part presents an affirmative case for loyalty
discounting from the buyer’s perspective. It does not attempt an
191

See, e.g., Salop & Cooper, supra n. xxx (discussing use of matching the
competition clauses as facilitating practices that soften competition in concentrated
markets).
192
See supra text accompanying notes xxx-xxx.
193
On the meaning of the foreclosure requirement, see Crane & Miralles, supra n.
xxx at 633-45.
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exhaustive catalog of the ways that loyalty discounts benefit buyers,
some of which were already discussed in the context of
distinguishing loyalty and volume-based discounts in Part I(A).
Rather, it shows that the conduct of buyers in not only accepting, but
in some cases in soliciting, loyalty discounts is an important piece of
empirical evidence in considering their effects on buyers. To that
end, this Part first discusses why buyer initiation should be relevant
to the antitrust inquiry and responds to critics who claim that it
should not. It then provides examples of loyalty discounts that have
been solicited or approved by dominant buyers who are unlikely to
be the victims of the sorts of collective action problems that could
lead buyers to grudgingly accept contractual provisions that are not in
their collective interests. Finally, it considers the relevance of a
strand of management literature discussing the benefits to buyers of
entering into loyalty relationships with suppliers.
A. The Relevance of Buyer Demand for Loyalty Discounts
Antitrust suspicion of loyalty incentives is motivated by the fear
that such incentives could harm the interests of buyers by enabling
sellers to obtain market power and to charge higher prices. Hence,
evidence that buyers affirmatively seek or approve of loyalty
discounts could provide some counter-evidence to this suspicion.194
And, indeed, buyers are often the instigators in seeking loyalty
discounts or other contractual terms that restrict their ability or
incentives to purchase from alternative suppliers195
194

See
Richard
M.
Steuer, Customer-Instigated
Exclusive
Dealing,
68 ANTITRUST L.J. 239 (2000) (arguing that buyer-initiated exclusive dealing
should sometimes be treated more favorably than seller-initiated ones, on the
theory that buyer initiation provides some evidence that the contract is not against
the buyer’s interests).
195
See, e.g., NicSand, 507 F.3d at 454 (observing that “[a]ccording to NicSand’s
own complaint, all but one of the large retailers made exclusivity a condition for
doing business with a new supplier .... If retailers have made supplier exclusivity a
barrier to entry, one cannot bring an antitrust claim against a supplier for
acquiescing to that requirement”); White & White, Inc. v. American Hospital
Supply Corp.,540 F. Supp. 951 (W.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 723
F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding arrangement where twenty-nine hospitals
formed a purchasing group and agreed to purchase from a single medical products
supplier offering nationwide distribution).
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Nonetheless, the mere fact that buyers are sometimes complicit in
loyalty discount schemes is not, in itself, conclusive evidence in
support of loyalty discounts’ procompetitive potential. Einer
Elhauge, one of loyalty discounts’ leading critics, has argued that
Elhauge
buyer-initiation of loyalty discounts is irrelevant.196
observes that buyers who enter into anticompetitive loyalty contracts
impose externalities on other buyers and that buyer face collective
action problems in minimizing these externalities.197 Elhauge argues
that these effects are exacerbated if the buyer is an intermediary
purchaser that can pass along most of any anticompetitive overcharge
to its own downstream buyers.198 Fleshing out this intuition, Elhauge
and Wickelgren propose a model under which there exists no
equilibrium in which all buyers reject the seller’s offer of a loyalty
inducement; hence the seller’s offer becomes coercive.199 Buyers
have no choice but to accept, because they will feel the exclusionary
effect whether or not they do and are better off at least taking the
crumbs offered under the guise of a loyalty discount.
Once again, it is questionable whether the assumptions
underlying this model are sufficiently general to make the model
analytically useful in deriving antitrust rules for the sorts of loyalty
discounts at issue in contemporary antitrust litigation. Elhauge and
Wickelgren assume that in order to secure loyalty commitments, the
buyer must contractually commit to purchase only from the seller.200
That assumption does not generally hold for two reasons. First, most
of the loyalty discounts at issue in recent cases did not involve any
contractual commitment of loyalty by the buyer. Usually, the buyer
remained contractually free to purchase goods from whomever it
chose, but received a better price for exhibiting loyalty to the
seller.201 Second, Elhauge and Wickelgren assume that, in order to
secure the loyalty discount, the buyer must agree not to purchase
goods from any of the seller’s rivals—that is to say, they assume pure

196

Elhauge, Failed Resurrection, supra n. xxx at 183.
Id.
198
Id.
199
Elhauge & Wickelgren, Robust Exclusion, supra n. xxx at 3.
200
Id. at 4.
201
See supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx.
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exclusive dealing.202 As noted earlier, however, most of the loyalty
discounts challenged in recent cases have required only partial
loyalty commitments—often in the 80-90% range.203
There is a more general point about the collective action
explanation for buyers’ acceptance of loyalty discounts. Collective
action problems would explain why buyers who cannot coordinate
with other buyers and are price takers would succumb to loyalty
discounts. It would not explain why dominant buyers who can and
do coordinate with other buyers or who have the power
independently to shape the seller’s pricing conduct would accept
loyalty discounts. Thus, evidence that dominant buyers or buyers
who coordinate with other buyers actively solicit loyalty discounts
undermines any claim that loyalty discounts are generally explicable
because of cost externalization and buyer collective action problems.
As with any of the claims discussed in this paper, evidence of
loyalty discount solicitation or approval by dominant or coordinating
buyers does not eliminate the possibility that loyalty discounts are
anticompetitive. They could still be anticompetitive in circumstances
where buyers are price takers or cannot coordinate. But evidence that
powerful buyers affirmatively seek loyalty discounts does suggest
that loyalty discounts may provide important benefits to all buyers.
As courts decide whether to treat loyalty discounts with hospitability
or inhospitability, evidence of buyer solicitation may be significant.
With that background, we turn to two examples of dominant or
coordinating buyers who actively use loyalty incentives to reduce
their acquisition costs.
B. Examples of Loyalty Discounts Sought by Dominant Buyers
1. The Federal Government
The federal government is the world’s largest purchaser.204 In
recent years, federal government procurement administrators have
emphasized the importance of leveraging the federal government’s
202

Elhauge & Wickelgren, Robust Exclusion, supra n. xxx at 4 (“[W]e do not
consider discounts based on partial loyalty. We assume loyalty discount contracts
require the buyer to not purchase any goods from the rival.”).
203
Supra text accompanying notes xxx – xxx.
204
Peter Orszag, Director, Office of Management and Budget, Buying in Bulk,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/blog/10/06/30/Buying-in-Bulk (June 30, 2010).
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massive spending power to reduce acquisition costs and save
taxpayers money.205 For example, in a statement to the Senate
Budget Committee, the Administrator for Federal Procurement in the
Office of Management and Budget listed the procurement initiatives
federal agencies had recently implemented in order to more
efficiently use taxpayer resources.206 Included in these was a strategic
sourcing initiative, in which agencies leverage their collective buying
power in order to secure better discounts from contractors. In order to
do this, agencies necessarily have to give up some amount of
individual choice in supplier and start using certain types of products
agency-wide or government-wide (such as office supplies). The
Administrator gave one example of DHS switching over to a
standardized department-wide operating system, and then negotiating
one contract for the full suite of desktop services at a substantial
savings.207
Federal procurement administrators have stressed the desirability
of using the Government’s massive spending power to negotiate
substantial discount terms. Among the cost-lowering tools urged by
procurement officers are Blanket Purchase Agreements (“BPAs”),
which secure supplier commitments to supply to federal buyers at
reduced costs.208 Although federal administrators stress the
importance of supplier competition at the contract negotiation
205

Id. (explaining the importance of leveraging the federal government’s spending
power to lower acquisition costs).
206
Statement of the Honorable Daniel I. Gordan, Administrator for Federal
Procurement, Office of Management & Budget, Before the Senate Committee on
the Budget (July 15, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/testimony/ofpp/Gord
on_testimony_715.pdf; Paul A. Denett, Administrator for Federal Procurement,
Office of Management & Budget, Memorandum, Guidance on Agency Fiscal Year
2007 Strategic Sourcing Reports (Mar. 11, 2008), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/procurement/strat_sourc/2007_r
eport_guidance.pdf.
207
Id. at 4 (“For example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) expects to
save more than $87 million during the next six years by having standardized
department-wide desktop operating systems, e-mail, and office automation and
then negotiating a department-wide BPA for the full suite of products at a
substantial savings.”).
208
Daniel I. Gordon, Administrator for Federal Procurement, Office of
Management & Budget, Memorandum, Achieving Better Value from Our
Acquisitions (Dec. 22, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/procurement_memo/Achi
eving_Better_Value_from_Acquisitions.pdf.
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stage,209 they also acknowledge the discount benefits of strategic
Federal law permits sole source
sole-source contracting.210
contracting under some circumstances211 and federal administrators
have defended it as a means of securing superior contractual terms.212
Although the federal government often simply leverages its
buying volume to secure superior prices, it also engages in the
loyalty-bargaining strategy of trading government market share for
superior pricing. Airline travel is a case in point. The Government
Services Agency (“GSA”) negotiates price schedules with airlines for
various routes that are contingent upon the federal government’s
delivery of minimum market share of federal travel. As the GSA
explains:
209

Better Value from Our Acquisitions (Dec. 22, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/procurement_memo/Achi
eving_Better_Value_from_Acquisitions.pdf (“The GAO found that agencies did
not take advantage of opportunities for competition in establishing BPAs – a sure
way to get better deals – and often considered only one vendor. Frequent use of
single award BPAs resulted in a lack of competition on resulting orders.”). See
also Government Services Administration, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Sheet, Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative (FSSI), Office Supply Blanket Purchase
Agreements (BPAs), available at
http://www.dm.usda.gov/procurement/toolkit/FSSIOfficeSupplyBPAsFAQs.pdf
(last accessed Nov. 5, 2011).
210
Id. (“Seek discounts when establishing schedule BPAs and, as appropriate,
when placing orders, especially large dollar orders. Discounts may be sought in a
number of ways, such as in the request for quote when establishing the BPA or
during negotiations. Agencies should consider making the offer of a discount by
the contractor a condition for awarding the BPA. For existing BPAs, focus on those
for which no discount has been sought, especially for products and where only one
BPA has been awarded. If, upon review, the agency determines that renegotiation
of a BPA could lead to discounts—or deeper discounts—for agency buyers,
explore, in consultation with agency counsel, what options are immediately
available.”).
211
Competition in Contracting Act (“CICA”), 41 U.S.C. § 3301 (2006). Sole
source contracting bears greater risks to competition than contractual terms
rewarding loyalty, since under sole-source contracting there is neither competition
for the contract nor competition under the contract.
212
Joseph Jordan, Senate Subcommittee on Contracting
Oversight, Contracting Preferences for Alaska Native Corporations (July 16, 2009)
(“In terms of sole source authority not providing the best value, I do somewhat
reject that on its premise….in every contract, and this also applies to all sole source
contracts, the contracting office must certify that the government got fair and
reasonable value and it must monitor performance of that contract and can
terminate it if the contracting officer sees fit. So to say that the government did not
get the best value because it was sole sourced is, or should be, inaccurate.”).
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GSA concentrates on the government’s market share to make
the most of the competition available. The government
traveler’s responsibility is to use the contract carrier. The
government’s delivery of market share drives the program.
So, to ensure the fares stay favorable, we encourage federal
travelers to use the contract carrier.213
It is hard to imagine that the federal government, whose
employees probably fly hundreds of millions of miles a year, is a
victim of a collective action problem that forces the GSA to offer
market share commitments in exchange for not being penalized by
disloyalty discounts. A far more plausible explanation is that the
federal government is a big, powerful, and sophisticated buyer that
has figured out how to offer market share (i.e., loyalty)—and not just
volume—as a bargaining chip to decrease its input acquisition costs.
2. Buying Organizations
Another piece of evidence pointing against the claim that buyer
initiation or approval of loyalty discounts does not count since buyers
face intractable collective action problems is the pervasive
deployment of loyalty discounts by buyers’ organizations that come
into being precisely in order to coordinate buyer decisions and hence
solve collective action problems. These are matters of degree, since
coordinated action by just a few buyers in a market with many buyers
would not overcome buyer-wide collective action problems.
However, when buyers create buying organizations representing
large percentages of the buyers in a market expressly for the purpose
of leveraging buyer power and driving down prices and those
organizations then bargain for loyalty discounts, the cost
externalization/collective action story becomes much less persuasive.
Buyers’ organizations in various health care fields provide strong
examples of power buyers deploying their bargaining power to exact
loyalty discounts.214 Take, for instance, Pharmacy Benefit Managers
213

U.S. General Services Administration, Information for Federal Travelers,
Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/103835.
214
A number of the recent loyalty discount cases have occurred in the medical
devices industry, where large GPOs, representing large aggregations of hospitals,
pervasively bargain for market share and other loyalty discounts. Hovenkamp,
Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, supra n. xxx at 103. GPOs are designed in
50
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(“PBMs”) which have recently come under scrutiny for their
contracting practices.215 PBMs manage the pharmacy benefits of
group health plans sponsors such as HMOs, self-insured employees,
indemnity plans, labor union plans, and public employee plans.216

large part to solve collective action problems and leverage buyer power, John B.
Kirkwood & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., The Path to Profitability: Reinvigorating the
Neglected Phase of Merger Analysis, 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 39, 94 (2009)
(discussing how retail pharmacies have solved collective action problems by
forming group purchasing organizations). Hence might provide a counter-story to
the claim that buyer collective action problems undermine the evidence that buyers
solicit loyalty discounts. However, GPOs have come under criticism for failing to
serve the interests of their member hospitals, S. PRAKASH SETHI, GROUP
PURCHASING ORGANIZATIONS:
AN UNDISCLOSED SCANDAL IN THE U.S.
HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY (2009); Einer Elhauge, The Exclusion of Competition for
Hospital Sales Through Group Purchasing Organizations (June 25, 2002),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/elhauge/pdf/gpo_report_june_02.pdf.. But see
Herbert Hovenkamp, Group Purchasing Organization (GPO) Purchasing
Agreements
and
Antitrust
Law
(January
2004),
http://higpa.siteym.com/resource/resmgr/press_releases_2004/2004hovenkampgposandantitrus.pdf
(arguing that GPO arrangements can lower prices and provide procompetitive
benefits); Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Improving Health
Care:
A
Dose
of
Competition
(July
2004)
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf
(Chapter
4)
(considering both procompetitive and potentially anticompetitive aspects of GPO
agreements), so this example would require a longer exploration.
215
Elhauge has extended his criticisms of GPOs to PBMs, arguing that “[t]he
largest PBM has a smaller market share than the largest GPO and thus would
externalize even more of the market harm that would be caused if it agreed to an
anticompetitive loyalty agreement” Elhauge, Failed Resurrection, supra n. xxx at
184. Elhauge’s comments have been overtaken by subsequent events. Following
the Express-Scripts/MedCo merger, the combined company had a market share
over 40% and was effectively in a duopoly situation with CVS Caremark. Daniel
Weiss, FTC Approves Express Scripts-Medco Merger, Pharmacy Times (April 3,
2012), http://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/FTC-Approves-Express-ScriptsMedco-Merger.
216
See United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Hon. Byron L.
Dorgan, U.S. Senate, Federal Employees’ Health Benefits: Effects of Using
Pharmacy Benefit Managers on Health Plans, Enrollees, and Pharmacies (January
2003), http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/236828.pdf; Department of Justice &
51
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Ninety-five percent of patients with prescription drug coverage
receive their benefits through a PBM.217 PBMs play several roles on
behalf of plans. They determine what drugs should be on the plan
formulary and negotiate with retailers for reimbursement rates when
drugs on the formulary are dispensed at retail.218 PBMs also
negotiate with drug manufacturers for discounts or rebates on brand
name or generic drugs.219
Market share discounts are a large part of the PBM’s strategy to
drive down prices from drug manufacturers. Both the FTC and GAO
noted that manufacturer rebates were driven in large part by the
PBM’s ability to increase the manufacturer’s market share. 220 The
FDA has noted that PBM rebates from manufacturers are predicated
on the PBM “moving market share” to the manufacturer.221 Because
a few large PBMs are effectively bargaining agents on behalf of tens
of millions of patients, they exercise substantial leverage in these
negotiations.
Both the General Accounting Office and FTC have studied the
effect of PBMs on drug prices and found them to lower prices. For
Federal Trade Commission, Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition (July
2004), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/healthcare/040723healthcarerpt.pdf (Chapter 7).
217
FTC Report at 11.
218
Id. at 13-14.
219
Id. at 11.
220
GAO report at 11 (“Drug manufacturers provide
PBMs certain rebates depending not only on inclusion of their drugs on a
plan’s formulary but also on the PBMs’ ability to increase a manufacturer’s
market share for certain drugs.”); FTC Report at 14 (“[T[he contract negotiated
with the pharmaceutical manufacturer may provide a rebate off the fees owed by
the PBM based on (a) a percentage of AWP or some other wholesale benchmark,
(b) achieving certain specified sales or market share targets, (c) preferred
placement of certain drug products on the PBMs’ formulary, or (d) a combination
of items (a) - (c)”).
221
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Regulatory Information, §2.2,
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/FederalFoodDrugandCosm
eticActFDCAct/SignificantAmendmentstotheFDCAct/PrescriptionDrugMarketing
Actof1987/ucm256484.htm; see also Lawrence W. Abrams, Pharmacy Benefit
Managers as Bargaining Agents, http://www.nuretail.com/pbm_bargaining_paper.pdf (discussing PBMs’ use of market share
discounts).
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example, the GAO found that prices federal employees paid under
PBM contracts was 18% the price paid by patients without third party
coverage.222 The GAO attributed this in part to the manufacturer
rebates.223 In a subsequent report to Congress, the FTC found that
private-sector employers that offer prescription drug coverage pay
less when using a mail-order pharmacy owned by a PBM, as opposed
to using a mail-order or retail pharmacy that the PBM does not
own.224
Although PBMs have been criticized for not fully passing on their
rebates and cost savings to plans or insureds, there is little question
that PBMs have effectively reduced retail drug prices. If anything,
the primary criticism of PBMs is that they leverage too much buyer
power on behalf of insurance companies, squeezing discounts,
rebates, and other incentives out of retailers.225 As is well recognized
in economic theory, cooperative buying arrangements can create
monopsony power and thereby allow the purchasers to suppress
prices below the competitive level.226 Tellingly, the National
Association of Chain Drug Stores opposed the merger of two large
PBMs, Express Scripts and Medco, apparently fearing that a
powerful mega-PBM could squeeze prices even further.227
Monopsonization or oligopsonization by group purchasing
organizations may be an independent reason to fear loyalty discounts,
but it is the opposite of the one at issue in virtually of the
contemporary loyalty discounting cases. What the PBM story quite

222

GAO Report introduction.
GAO report at 9.
224
Pharmacy Benefit Managers: Ownership of Mail-Order Pharmacies, FTC
Report (August 2005),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/pharmbenefit05/050906pharmbenefitrpt.pdf.
225
GAO Report at introduction (Pharmacy associations report that the PBMs’ large
market shares leave some retail pharmacies with little leverage in negotiating with
PBMs. Retail pharmacies must accept discounted reimbursements from PBMs
they contract with and perform additional administrative tasks associated with
claims processing.”).
226
ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND
ECONOMICS 106-22 (2010).
227
NACDS White Paper, The Proposed Merger of Express Scripts and Medco,
(Oct. 2011, rev’d Feb. 2012), http://www.nacds.org/userassets/pdfs/2011/comm/nacds-white-paper_proposed-pbm-merger.PDF.
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clearly shows is that coordinating buyers can use loyalty discounts to
drive down prices.
Evidence of loyalty discounts sought by coordinating buyers
does not mean that buyers never face collective action problems that
dominant sellers exploit through offering loyalty discounts. But the
fact that buyers who can and do coordinate over large segments of
the market erodes the claim that buyers would only accept loyalty
discounts because of collective action problems. Some buyers may
find themselves in the position of accepting loyalty discounts that
they know injure buyers collectively, but that is far characteristic of
loyal buyers as a whole.
C. The Value of Buyer-Seller Loyalty
Having established that buyers at least sometimes seek loyalty
discounts in order to drive down their prices, we come finally to the
question of how loyalty discounts fit into broader issues of loyalty
between seller and buyer. For this, we turn to the management
literature on loyalty in buyer-seller relations.
A conventional model of business procurement holds that buyers
should deliberately not exhibit loyalty—that they should seek to
generate competition between rival sellers in order to obtain the
lowest possible prices and the best terms of purchase. Michael
Porter, for example, argues that total procurement costs will be
minimized by introducing and maintaining competition among
suppliers, which can only be realized if the buyer procures from
multiple sources.228 In Porter’s view, the threat of losing business to
another supplier who already has an established relationship with the
buyer incentivizes suppliers to deliver product quality at low cost.229
By contrast, a wide business management literature stresses the
benefits to buyers of entering into long-term monogamous or semimonogamous relationships with suppliers—of pursuing loyal
relationships.230 Among the frequently cited benefits of buyer-seller
228

MICHAEL PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE (1985); see also Richard G.
Newman, Single Sourcing: Short-Term Savings Versus Long-Term Problems, 25 J.
SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 20 (1989) (discussing short-term benefits of sole-source
contracting but observing that in the long run there can be negative effects, such as
reduced innovation and source dependency).
229
Porter, supra n. xxx.
230
See C. Jay Lambe, C. Michael Wittman & Robert E. Spekman, Social Exchange
Theory and Research on Business-to-Business Relational Exchange, 8 J. BUS.-TOBUS. MKTG. 1 (2001); Michael R. Leenders, Jean Nollet & Lisa M. Ellram,
54

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/72

54

Crane:
92 TEX. L. REV. ___ (2013)

2013]

Bargaining Over Loyalty

55

loyalty is trust-building.231 A long-term loyal relationship decreases
the likelihood of seller opportunism.232 The procurement literature
also stresses a number of other benefits to buyers of concentrating
purchases on a small number of sellers. Among these are minimizing
search and transaction costs,233 driving down acquisition costs
through the leverage of buying power, avoiding supply chain
disruptions,234 achieving economies of scope or scale,235 and
Adapting Purchasing to Supply Chain Management, 24 INT’L J. PHYSICAL
DISTRIBUTION & LOGISTICS MGMT. 40 (1994); W. Deming, Out of the Crisis, MIT
Center for Advanced Engineering Study (1986); F. Robert Dwyer, Paul H. Schurr
& Sejo Oh, Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships, 51 J. MKTG. 11 (1987); Achim
Walter, Thilo A. Mueller & Gabriele Helfert, The Impact of Satisfaction, Trust, and
Relationship Value on Commitment: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical
Results, Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Group Conference Proceedings
(2000), available at http://www.impgroup.org/uploads/papers/131.pdf; Michael J.
Dorsch, Scott R. Swanson & Scott W. Kelley, The Role of Relationship Quality in
the Stratification of Vendors as Perceived by Customers, 26 J. ACAD. MKTG. SCI.
128 (1998).
231
Lambe, supra n. xxx at 10-11, 21-22 (explaining how “trust [] enables firms to
become committed and look past short-term opportunities for the long-term
benefits available from the relationship”); Leeders, supra n. xxx at 23 (“Exchange
participants begin to expect that their partners will participate in cooperative
behaviors that benefit the firms. As these cooperative behaviors become common,
expected and acceptable either implicitly or explicitly, cooperation becomes a
norm.”);
232
Hawkins, supra n. xxx at xxx (noting that for-profit firms “frequently rely upon
the expected long-term duration of the relationship between a buyer and supplier to
decrease opportunism”).
233
Wedad J. Elmaghraby, Supply Contract Competition and Sourcing Policies, 2
MFG. & SERV. OPERATIONS MGMT. 350, 351 (2000) (“By pouring time and energy
into establishing one strong and lasting relationship, a buyer is able to cut down on
costs by avoiding downtime, rework, and excessive administration and increase
quality by establishing a relationship that is responsive to the buyer’s needs and
demands.”);
234
Eggert, supra n. xxx at 154 (“The advantages of working with fewer suppliers
are well documented in the purchasing and supply chain management literature.
From a cost perspective, placing a great emphasis on fewer suppliers allows a
customer to concentrate order volumes and gain more influence over vendors.”);
Elmaghraby, supra n. xxx at 351 (“[B]uyers who employ a single sourcing strategy
feel that the chance of a supply disruption is reduced when a buyer develops a
strong relationship with a single supplier.”); Mark Treleven & Sharon Bergman
Schweikhart, A Risk/Benefit Analysis of Sourcing Strategies: Single vs. Multiple
Sourcing, 7 OPERATIONS MGMT. 93 (1988) (“[B]buyers who employ a single
sourcing strategy feel that the chance of a supply disruption is reduced when a
buyer develops a strong relationship with a single supplier.”).
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contributing to product quality improvement by securing the seller’s
attention to the buyer’s needs.236
All of this sounds good for buyer loyalty, but raises a question
about loyalty discounts: If loyalty is so valuable to buyers, then why
do sellers have to pay them to stay loyal? If buyers gain so much by
staying loyal to a single seller, then why wouldn’t we observe buyers
seeking exclusive or semi-exclusive relationships with suppliers
without the need for any inducement by the seller?
There is an easy answer and a harder one. The easy answer is
that one of the benefits to buyers identified in the procurement
literature is price reductions.237 In other words, part of the gains to
buyers from loyal relationships comes from the fact that their loyalty
allows them to obtain lower prices from sellers.
The harder answer has to do with the fact that loyal buyer-seller
relationships can simultaneously benefit both buyers and sellers.238
Some of their gains from loyalty—such as transaction cost reduction,
achieving scale economies, or enhancing business planning—may be
joint. In that case, the seller and buyer’s relative bargaining positions
determine how they allocate their mutual gains between themselves.
Other aspects of a customer’s loyalty may benefit one party at the
expense of the other, or may provide the parties asymmetric benefits
and costs. If a loyalty commitment elasticizes the buyer’s demand

235

Elmaghraby, supra n. xxx at 351 (“In addition, buyers feel that they receive the
best price from their single supplier because of the economies of scale achieved
from being awarded all of the buyer’s business.”); Manohar U. Kalwani &
Narakersari Narayandas, Long-Term Manufacturer Relationships: Do They Pay Off
for Supplier Firms?, 59 J. MKTG. 1 (1995) (“From a customer’s point of view,
supplier relationships should be built in order to achieve increased cost efficiency,
increased effectiveness, enabling technologies and increased competitiveness.”).
236
Eggert, supra n. xxx at 154 (explaining how loyal buyers can induce sellers to
pay greater attention to their needs and contribute to lowering production costs and
influence product innovation).
237
Supra n. xxx.
238
Amy Zhaohui Zeng, A Synthetic Study of Sourcing Strategies, 100 INDUSTRIAL
MANAGEMENT & DATA SYSTEMS 219 (2000) (“It can be noticed that the
overlapped benefits for both buyer and supplier are revealed in cost reduction,
improved communication, flexibility, and stability.”); F. Robert Dwyer, Paul H.
Schurr & Sejo Oh, Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships, 51 J. MKTG. 11 (1987)
(discussing possibility of possibility of “significant gains in joint-and consequently
individual-payoffs as a result of effective communication and collaboration to
attain goals.”).
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and thereby enhances its ability to demand a lower price, the seller
loses.239
Loyalty is a bargaining chip with varied consequences for sellers
and buyers. Without examining the circumstance facing the parties
in a particular case, it is impossible to determine how the chips will
land for each side. It is clear, however, that loyalty is an important
part of the bargain in many cases and has the potential to increase the
welfare of buyers, sellers, or both. An antitrust policy that
discouraged or restricted the use of loyalty provisions could reduce
buyer welfare and social welfare overall.
CONCLUSION
Loyalty incentives can be exclusionary if they prevent the seller’s
rivals from competing for loyal customer business and foreclose so
239

See Klein & Murphy, supra n. xxx. Elhauge has argued that the Klein-Murphy
model of demand elasticization through loyalty commitments is implausible
because, if it were true, sellers with market power would avoid contracts with
loyalty provisions. Elhauge, Failed Resurrection, supra n. xxx at 185 (“Under [the
Klein-Murphy] model, the two sellers in a differentiated market would sell at cost
and earn zero profits if they used exclusive contracts, but would sell at prices that
were double their cost if they did not. Given that premise, it is hard to see why the
sellers would be willing to bid on an exclusive basis, let alone why, as Klein and
Murphy assert, sellers would have “the exact same motivation” as retailers to
initiate exclusive bidding. Under their model, exclusive contracts harm the sellers
and thus any seller with market power would avoid them.”). But that argument
ignores the multifaceted nature of the benefits and costs to both sellers and buyers
of loyalty inducements.
Sellers may obtain other benefits from loyalty
commitments—such as expanding their market share, leveraging fixed costs over
more dollars of revenue, achieving scale economies, and optimizing planning—that
offset any losses from facing a more elastic demand curve. Further, Elhauge’s
argument begins with the assumption that loyalty discounts are always seller-driven
strategies, or that sellers have the power to resist them. In fact, as noted, buyers are
often the instigators. Sellers would obviously like buyer loyalty without awarding
discounts, but faced with a buyer demand for a discount in exchange for loyalty,
they may not have the power to say no, particularly if the buyer has decided to
award the bulk of its purchases to a single seller and a refusal to entertain a demand
for loyalty discount means losing the bulk of the customer’s business. Sellers
bargain for loyalty and buyers bargain for discounts; loyalty discounts are the
marriage of these countervailing pressures.
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much of the relevant market that the rivals are unable to compete.
But that usually is not the case. To the contrary, loyalty discounts are
often granted in robustly competitive markets and have no
exclusionary effects. They bring lower prices to customers willing to
forgo their variety preferences and consolidate a majority of their
purchases in a single supplier.
This Article has not proposed a comprehensive legal or economic
framework within which to assess loyalty incentives. Rather, it has
suggested that, as a starting point, courts and antitrust agencies think
about loyalty discounts as true discounts—as price reductions below
the price the buyer would have to pay if it decided not to behave
loyally. As such, loyalty discounts belong squarely within antitrust’s
hospitability tradition for unilateral, non-predatory price discounts,
even those that cause discomfiture to competitors.
Loyalty is considered a virtue in most areas of law. Antitrust
should be no exception.
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